

THE SECURITIZATION AND THE REVIVAL OF EURASIANISM IN CONTEMPORARY EURASIA

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Abstract. This paper aims to analyze two main events that took place in the post-Soviet space and roused the academic and political debate in the West: the January events in Kazakhstan with the first intervention of the CSTO and Russia's "Special Military Operation" in Eastern Ukraine. Contrary to some experts' worries about the participation of the Russian Army in the CSTO intervention into the sovereign territory of Kazakhstan, the CSTO troops left the Central Asian country at an established time. One month later the Russian Army entered Ukraine demonstrating to the world that contemporary Russia has not abandoned its dream and aim of rebuilding a multi-national structure led by Russia. The "Special Military Operation" has brought back to the academic debate the concept of Eurasianism, an ideology that has influenced post-Soviet Russia's politics and that has been mentioned by the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, in important speeches. Eurasianism will be deeply analyzed in this paper since this ideology, "buried" in libraries for years, has conquered the highest sphere of Russian power. Eurasianism, as well as the intervention in Kazakhstan and Ukraine, have been enforced by the presence and support of a political partner that lies East: the People's Republic of China.

Key words: Eurasia, Central Asia, CSTO, Eurasianism, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, EAEU, Russia.

Introduction

In 2022 two main events question and challenge Russia's ambitions in the ex-Soviet Republics, reigniting the public debate.

Proceeding in chronological order, the first one happened in Kazakhstan, the country where the "Eurasian Union" concept was forged through the words of the former and first President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, though it came into force starting in 2007 [1]. During the January events of 2022 in Kazakhstan, for the very first time, we witnessed not only the Russian military participation in a sovereign country, though upon the Kazakhstan government's call for help,

but also the activation of an international security body, the CSTO, which had existed for over 20 years but it had never intervened before.

Almost two months later, a second event with a more international reach took place in the ex-Soviet Union territory, nowadays Ukraine's land. On the 24th of February 2022, the Russian army entered Ukraine's territory leading Russia to be involved in an armed conflict in Ukraine, a conflict announced in Russia as спецоперация (specoperacia, trans. Special operation). According to the Russian government, one of the main reasons for conducting the "Special Operation" is the aim of canceling and eradicating the Nazi forces in Ukraine [2].

After the military penetration in Ukraine, the consequences for the Russian Federation have been and will be, not only from an economical side, caused by several sanctions packages imposed by Western countries but also a political outcome that should not be underestimated. The political isolation by Western countries led Russia to look eastward, towards Asia and it's most economically involved actor, China, one of the countries that have been indirectly attacked for it's tacit support to Russia.

This paper aims to analyze two main consequences for Russia after Kazakhstan and Ukraine events. The first one is the securitization of the "Eurasian" continent whereas the second one is an analysis of the Eastwards perspectives for Russia that recall, with different and more "updated" terms, the ideology of Eurasianism.

Methodology

This paper is written 3 months after the end of Kazakhstan's events and while the Russian "Special Operation" in Ukraine has not finished and is intensifying the attacks on the Ukrainian lands. The conquest of Mariupol' is a piece of news that has been officialize less than 2 days ago. Due to the contemporaneity and mutability of events, it is difficult, if not impossible, to use an academic paper to describe the current situation in Ukraine and the January events in Kazakhstan. The academic community is still discussing these topics from a different perspective compared to journalists'. Nevertheless, to be able to discuss this topic, I had to read, cite and refer to some pieces of news available in highly valued newspapers.

Although interregional and international organizations are involved, the ideology used in the material interpretation and paper elaboration is Neo-realism since, in my opinion, it is the one that best fits in the analysis of the securitization and the actions led in Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Combined with the theory Post-Soviet studies, the ideological approach related to Neo-realism and Eurasianism is the main method employed in this paper to discuss contemporary events related to the relations between Post-Soviet countries.

Kazakhstan January Events and the First CSTO Intervention

Kazakhstan January events, known in Kazakhstan as “Bloody January” (Қанды қантар - qandy qantar), recall the uprising that took place in December 1986, commonly known in Kazakh as “Jeltoqsan” (Желтоқсан - December). In 1986, following civil protests, the Soviet army was deployed in Kazakhstan to defend the country. After the increase in the number of protesters against the forced dismissal of Dinmukhamed Kunayev, an ethnic Kazakh holding the place as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan who was substituted by the Russian Gennady Kolbin. When the protests raised and started to spread around the country, the Central Committee in Moscow decided to deploy the army to seize and stifle the protests [3]. Though many differences can be found between the December events in 1986 and the January events in 2022, some similarities can also be analyzed and commented on. In 2022 Kazakhstan and its army were not able to stop and stifle the protests happening in the Western and Southern regions of the country and the current president Tokayev was obliged to resort to the help of Kazakhstan’s allies and CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization), also known as ОДКБ (ОДКВ) in Russian (Организация Договора о коллективной безопасности - Organizacija Dogovora o kolletivnoj bezopasnosti). The intervention of the CSTO troops, officially in Kazakhstan for a limited time, was labeled as peace-keeping operations, and the soldiers were only deployed to protect sites of national interests such as airports and governmental palaces [4].

CSTO is a military alliance between six countries: the Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia. The idea of a military alliance started in 1992, immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the following year other ex-Soviet countries adhered to the alliance that was, at that time, made up of nine countries, including Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Azerbaijan as well. The three latter countries decided not to renovate their membership for 5 years in 1997 and left the “Collective Security Treaty” that was founded in 1992. The remainders not only renewed their membership but five years later established the “Collective Security Treaty Organization”.

As a military alliance, the CSTO aims to cooperate and assist the member countries in case of threats to a country’s security. For its military assistance and support, CSTO has been often compared to NATO but underestimated in the last years due to its absolutely non-interventionism after the calls from member countries’ leaders. The 2010 Kyrgyz-Uzbek unrests in the Fergana valley are by far the most emblematic fact of the NON-activism of the CSTO. Following calls for help by the Kyrgyz president Roza Otunbaeva, the CSTO decided not to deploy troops to seize the protests. Kyrgyzstan was completely left alone to solve its internal security problems [5]. Armenia, during the Sec-

ond Armenia-Azerbaijan war on Nagorno Karabakh, experienced the same fate having been abandoned by the military alliance to which it belongs [6].

The situation developed differently in Kazakhstan during the January events since, after less than a week since the beginning of the protests, Nikola Pashinyan, the Armenian Prime Minister and head of the CSTO, after consultations with the head of the other members, agreed with deploying the army in Kazakhstan under an official “peace-keeping” mission. The call for help has been, highly possibly, accepted due to the intervention of foreign forces in Kazakhstan’s unrests, which have been considered a terroristic threat with external interference into the territory of a sovereign country [7].

The CSTO was activated for the very first time during the Kazakhstan events of January, changing completely the future of the alliance that turned out to be a victorious association since peace was established in Kazakhstan in the short period required by Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev.

The period needed by the CSTO troops has been one of the most discussed topics during the events because many analysts saw the unrest as an opportunity for Russia to establish it’s control and presence in Kazakhstan, a danger that has been demonstrated to be wrong since Russia’s army, as well as other countries’, left Kazakhstan once the situation came back to normality [8].

The “Special Operation” in Ukraine

The entrance of the Russian army into the territories of a sovereign state, located in Europe and which had advanced requests to join NATO and European Union has completely changed our view of the world and some analysts see the Russian invasion of Ukraine as the starting point of a New World where the historical fight between the two superpowers has restarted again, recalling to our mind the Cold War. While the reasons behind the struggle between the Soviet Union and the Western Bloc, headed by the United States, have changed, indeed, we are no more dealing with a fight between capitalism and socialism, between liberal and communist ideas, the world is still fragmented into two main areas that we could define, in a Eurocentric view, the West and the East. While some alliances have never ceased, notably the one between the United States, NATO members, South Korea, Japan, and Australia, others have started to slowly be interrupted. Nevertheless, even with some hesitations or official condemnation of the Russian presence in Ukraine, many “Eastern” countries did and still do support Russia. The main actor is, doubtlessly, China which has immediately backed Russia when it has been isolated from the West through economical sanctions. China agreed to buy wheat, gas, and other raw materials from Russia, and Beijing also refused to condemn the Russian operations in Ukraine and opted for an abstention from the vote at the UN. China is not the

only country that acted in a, at least officiously, friendly way with Russia. Other big countries abstained from condemning Russia, among them India, Pakistan, Iran, South Africa, and, expectedly, Central Asian countries and Armenia [9].

Abstention has been considered by several analysts as a betrayal of Russia by numerous allies, including China and Kazakhstan. I do believe that countries with strong economic relations with Europe and the US could not officially support Russia's invasion of Ukraine and opted for abstention, a safe way to support Russia, to keep relations with the West, and to protect themselves, the last one is especially valid for Russia's neighboring countries such as Kazakhstan which, since its independence, has been threatened by Russia because of the ethnic composition of the Northern regions of the country where Russians constitute a majority.

Contemporary world politics and international relations have been analyzed with a bipolar view (the United States and allies vs Russia and allies) but until the beginning of 2022, the conflict was kept "cold" and mainly managed through diplomatic ways. After Ukraine's facts, the whole world had to realize that the Cold War has never ended and that every country has to take a position, even if the war will be limited inside Ukraine's border. And the configuration of the international arena brings our minds back to the years when an "Iron Curtain" divided Europe. Even if Europe is now united as it has never been, the Iron Curtain still exists in Asia and Africa. The UN Resolution's results clearly show how the bipolar world is and will be.

According to President Vladimir Putin's words, the official reasons behind the Russian "Special Operation" are to be seen in the attempt to denazify the Eastern oblasts of Ukraine, also known as Donbas where the Azov Regiment has been based since the self-declared independence of Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts. Eastern Ukraine, in opposition to the Western part of the country, has always been more Russified and the majority of the population uses Russian as their native language. 2019 law on languages of Ukraine, approved by the former President Poroshenko, aiming to elevate Ukrainian to the sole republic language, was highly criticized in Russia because it would have strongly affected the Russian majority living in the eastern territory of Ukraine.

The threat of the "Russian minority" in countries other than Russia has always been used as an excuse by Moscow to impose its control and power on ex-Soviet countries such as Latvia, Estonia, and, notably, Kazakhstan.

Whatever the Russian reasons are, the Western block spoke against Russia's plan even before its entrance into Ukraine. A few days after the starting of the Ukraine invasion, on February 21st, 2022 Vladimir Putin officially recognized the independence of the Republic of Donetsk [10] and the Republic of Lugansk [11], a decision that could not be accepted by Western countries since it would have affected the official borders of Ukraine and the non-violation of

borders is one of the key points of Liberalism. Russia had already modified Ukraine's borders in 2014 when the Autonomous State of Crimea voted in a referendum with the majority of 95.5% asking for annexation to the Russian Federation [12].

What we are assisting now in Ukraine is not only the invasion of Russia in Ukraine with the relative war, or "Special Operation" as it must be referred to in Russia. Russian actions are a clear violation of the International Law and it is a "war declaration" to the doctrine of Liberalism which has been preponderant in the West.

Eurasian Integration or the Dream of a New Soviet Union 2.0?

The penetration of the Russian army into a sovereign country has clearly shown that Russian ambitions have never faded and that a project of building the new Soviet Union, or at least a similar institution, has reached its peak. After the breakdown of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia needed to establish relations with the whole world but could not lose the support of the new republics that once used to form the Union. The Soviet Union was not officially over yet when the leader of Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine signed the Belovezh Accords (Беловежские соглашения – Belovezhskaya agreement) in December 1991 to create a new institution called CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), a direct heir of the Soviet Union since the members of the CIS are the same countries which once was Socialist Soviet Republics. Only the 3 Baltic states refused to adhere to the CIS since they have always seen their belonging to the Soviet Union as a military annexation. Turkmenistan, as part of its neutrality policy, belongs to the CIS as an associate member whereas Georgia and Ukraine withdrew their membership in 2009 and 2015 respectively. The reason for this withdrawal has to be seen in the Russian backing of South Ossetian and Abkhazian separatist movements that led to a war against Georgia in 2008. The conflict lasted only 12 days and it ended with the de facto independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the expulsion of ethnic Georgians from the two self-proclaimed republics. Ukraine applied to withdraw its membership following the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014. The new conflict in Ukraine is weakening Russia's influence even on Western countries that have always been close, at least officiously, to Russia. Not only Ukraine but also Moldova, a member of the CIS, applied officially to be a member of the European Union because of the Russian threat that has always been part of the Moldovan politics, especially due to the presence of the self-proclaimed Republic of Transnistria in its legal borders. Transnistria is nowadays under the observation of political analysts and government due to its special status and strong alliance with the Russian Federation and could be the gateway for an

escalation of the war inside the borders of another sovereign country, Moldova. Other countries that for decades refused to adhere to NATO such as Finland and Sweden have decided to file their application as members to contrast Russian expansion to the West [13].

Russia's role in Europe has weakened and the Kremlin has lost all its allies, mainly among the far-right parties of Europe, and now, more than ever, Russia needs to watch towards East, where the majority of its territories lie and where its influences, though decreased, are still strong. Under the presidency of Vladimir Putin in Russia, the Kremlin understood that a stronger alliance with the closest allies had to be implemented. In 2001 the organization, previously known as Shanghai Five, which included China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, changed not only its name but also its policies to implement political and economical agreements and cooperation. In 2001 the new association, extended to Uzbekistan as well, was named Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO - Шанхайская организация сотрудничества). The SCO now includes also India and Pakistan and has, as observer members, Mongolia, Iran, and Belarus among others.

The following year, in 2002, Putin decided to establish the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) which is often considered the Eastern response to NATO since, in Article n.4, it is written that any aggression towards one of the members of CSTO will be considered as aggression to all other member states, these being: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia [14]. Not fully satisfied with the CSTO agreement, in 2010 three members of the Eurasian Economic Community (ЕАЕС - Евразийское экономическое сообщество), a regional organization established in 2000, decided to join the Eurasian Customs Union (EACU - Таможенный союз), the three countries being Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. In 2015 Kyrgyzstan and Armenia also joined the EACU and in the same year, the Eurasian Economic Union (ЕЕУ - Евразийский экономический союз) substituted the former ЕАЕС.

Eurasianism: Will Russia's Ideology "Conquer" its Allies?

The ambitions of Putin's politics towards Central Asia or, as it can be more properly defined, Eurasia are not new and they were exposed in 2000 in their speech at АРЕС (Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation) when he stated: "Россия всегда ощущала себя евроазиатской страной. Мы никогда не забывали о том, что основная часть российской территории находится в Азии" [15] (Russia has always considered itself as a Eurasian country. We have never forgotten that the bulk of Russian territory is in Asia). As Aldo Ferrari states in his article [16], what Putin refers to in his speech is the "Eurasianism", called Евразийство (Eurasianism in Russian, a movement that represents the

most radical tradition of Russia in identifying itself as a country not belonging to Asia or Europe, but a third way that develops independently. Russia would be a third entity in the developed world with its characteristics. Strongly condemned during the Soviet Union, Eurasianism took strength in the years following the breakdown of the USSR through the ideas of Alexander Dugin who, as reported by Marlène Laruelle, “exercises a semi-monopoly over a certain part of the current Russian ideological spectrum” [17]. Compared to the Eurasian ideology of the first thinkers, such as Nikolai S. Trubetskoy, Peter N. Savitsky, and Roman O. Jakobson, and even the “Soviet” Lev Gumilev, Dugin’s ideas are more oriented towards a nationalistic ideology, often associated and related to the ultra-right political ideas, leading towards anti-Western propaganda. Dugin’s ideas had a huge impact in Russia, he even created a political party that, once founded in 2001, supported Putin, although, as underlined by Ferrari, Putin’s speech, and I would add ideas, was focused on the Eurasian collocation of Russian rather than on a Eurasian ideology [18].

Analyzing the choices advanced by Putin since 2000, I believe that Eurasianism, at least from a geopolitical and economic point of view, is influencing Russian policies and the trend increased in the last year. Since the annexation of Crimea, the Western world changed its relations with Russia, imposing sanctions against the Kremlin, a move that led Russia to direct toward the East and to separate from Europe, the continent which Russia had watched for centuries during the Tsarist period. The willingness to tighten the bonds not only with the Central Asian Republics through CSTO and EAEU, but also with bigger countries like China, India, and Iran is, in my opinion, the perfect attempt of Russia to show its Asian, or Eurasian, soul. Eurasianism should be a third way and, if Russia had been successful, it could have become the trait-d’-union between East and West and its geographical position would have increased the political and economic relations of Moscow with Europe and China.

After the crisis in Ukraine, Russia cut all ties with the West, and I do not think that they can be re-established in the next months or even years. At the same time, Russia is still playing the Cold War with the presumption of being in a bipolar world and being the USSR. Until the collapse of the USSR, Moscow used to play the main role among the Socialist block of countries thanks to its political and economic power, but Russia passed the baton to China several years ago and this must be taken into consideration by the Russian leadership.

China: Russia’s Brother who Watches West

The Russian economy has decreased steadily in the last years and the use of sanctions against Russia due to the invasion of Ukraine has worsened the economic stability of the country. In its war against “Nazism” in Ukraine, Putin

is left alone and its main economic partner, apart from the members of CSTO, is China. The relations between China and Russia have changed over the years and they witnessed an inversion of power. China was subdued by the Soviet Union during the Cold War due to the political and economic power of Moscow, but things have completely changed in the last years and Russia could have not undertaken such a risky and massive action against Ukraine without the tacit and unofficial support of China who has immediately supported Russia economically, purchasing wheat, oil, and other products. Although the Russian market was not of primary importance to China, which has bigger interests in the European and American markets, the territory of Russia and the Euro Asiatic Union is extremely important and vital for the growth of Chinese influence in Europe and the whole world [19]. The Chinese project “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI - 丝绸之路经济带) was inaugurated by the Chinese president Xi Jinping in 2015 in Astana (former name of Nur-Sultan) in 2013 during his meeting with the former president of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev. The project is considered one of the biggest infrastructural projects ever made by humankind since it aims to connect the whole world, mainly Asia - Africa - Europe, through transport infrastructures that would help the worldwide trade and exchange. The core of the BRI project in Kazakhstan and the whole of Eurasia (including Central Asia and Russia) since the main railways of the BRI will cross these countries to reach Northern Europe or Southern Europe, mainly Turkey, where the Belt Road will encounter the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road that departs from Chinese ports crossing the South Chinese Sea, the Strait of Malacca, Indian Ocean, the strait of Bab al-Mandeb and finally reaches the Mediterranean Sea via the Suez channel.

The role of China in Central Asia is getting important in Central Asia and Russia is aware of the Chinese influence and power, that is probably the reason why during the January Events of Kazakhstan in 2022, the role of Russia has been quite quiet and fast. I believe that Russia could have not stayed in Kazakhstan because an escalation of events in Ukraine was already planned by the Kremlin since the tones between Russia and Western countries were getting stronger and more aggressive. Knowing that Russia would have been isolated by the West, the Kremlin could not lose China's support and “friendship”, which would have probably left Russia if Moscow had interfered with Kazakhstan and the BRI project in China. Moreover, Russia could not even lose the biggest and richest ally in the CSTO, not only for a hypothetical military intervention in Ukraine but also for assistance in case of isolation. Kazakhstan is in a difficult position between welcoming a big number of Russian citizens who have left Russia because of the sanction imposed on Moscow, preparing a plan against the sanctions against Russia, and its role as an ally of Russia, which Kazakhstan still has a “debt” to [20].

Conclusion

In conclusion, Russia has had many interests in Central Asia because it has always been aware of the opportunities and benefits that the area could offer it. The new integration wished by Putin since 2000 watches east and it gave life to a new identity for Russia and the republic involved in this regionalism approach, the revitalization of Euroasianism. Russia wants to detach itself from Europe but Moscow is aware that a fully Asian identity does not reflect the social and political situation of Russia. The creation of a new Eurasian identity needs to be supported by other countries that have always been left away or underestimated because of their identity that does not perfectly match with standard categories. This is true for Central Asian countries, especially Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan where the population is ethnically Asian but does not belong, culturally, to the Western idea of Asia, full of Orientalism in its views; Central Asians are predominantly Muslims but the secularism of the population does not allow to insert these countries into a “Larger Middle East”; Central Asia cannot even be considered Russian because, since the independence, the new national and ethnic belonging has been encouraged and this has separated many Central Asians from their Russian identity. While Central Asians are looking for a wider identity, some can find it in Pan Turkism, probably the concept of Eurasian is the closest one to reality and it is on this point that Russia wants to develop its influence on Central Asia. Not considering themselves fully European, as the narration was under the Tsarist period, Russia is approaching Central Asian governments and, consequently, China and its project of the BRI that is planned to create an even bigger regional unity than the one already existent: the SCO and Armenia could be integrated to ASEAN, a project that would include almost all countries of Asia, the majority of which have not condemned the Russian facts. The abstention of these countries is often seen as a victory by the Western analysts but, I disagree with this Western-oriented view. An abstention at the UN for the use of weapons in a sovereign country should be considered a non-condemnation. Russia is isolated by the West and, even if its economy will slow down quickly and Putin and his establishment will have to find a fast solution to avoid bankruptcy and unrest in the country, Russia has still some allies in the Eastern part of the world, exactly where Russia has been watched so far.

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Джиоммони Ф.

Секьюритизация и возрождение евразийства в Евразии

Аннотация. Цель данной статьи заключается в анализе двух главных событий, произошедших в постсоветском пространстве и породивших академические и политические дебаты на Западе: январские события в Казахстане с первым вмешательством ОДКБ и «специальная военная операция» России в Восточной Украине. Вопреки опасениям некоторых экспертов по поводу участия российской армии во вхождении ОДКБ на суверенную территорию Казахстана, войска ОДКБ покинули центральноазиатскую страну в установленное время. Один месяц спустя российская армия вошла в Украину, демонстрируя миру, что современная Россия не оставила свою мечту и цель о воссоздании мультинациональной структуры, возглавляемой Россией. «Специальная военная операция» вернула академические дебаты о концепции евразийства, идеологии, влиявшей на политику постсоветской России и упоминаемой в важных речах российского президента Владимира Путина. В данной статье глубоко анализируется евразийство, поскольку эта идеология, «похороненная» на годы в библиотеках, завоевала высшую сферу российской власти. Евразийство, так же, как и интервенция в Казахстан и Украину, было усилено присутствием и поддержкой политического партнера с Востока: Китайской Народной Республики.

Ключевые слова: Евразия, Центральная Азия, ОДКБ, евразийство, Казахстан, Украина, ЕАЭС, Россия.

Джиоммони Ф.

Секьюритизация және Еуразиядағы еуразияшылдықтың жандануы

Аңдатпа. Бұл мақаланың мақсаты – посткеңестік кеністікте орын алған және Батыста академиялық және саяси пікірталас тудырған екі негізгі оқиғаны талдау: ҰҚШҰ-ның алғашқы араласуымен Қазақстандағы қаңтар оқиғасы және Ресейдің Шығыс Украинадағы «арнайы әскери операциясы». Кейбір сарапшылардың Ресей әскерінің ҰҚШҰ-ның Қазақстанның егеменді аумағына кіруіне байланысты үрейіне қарамастан, ҰҚШҰ әскерлері белгіленген уақытта Орталық Азия елінен шығып кетті. Бір айдан кейін Ресей әскері Украинаға кіріп, қазіргі заманауи Ресей көпұлтты құрылымды қайта құру арманы мен мақсатынан бас тартпағанын әлемге көрсетті. «Арнайы әскери операция» посткеңестік Ресейдің саясатына әсер еткен және Ресей президенті Владимир Путиннің маңызды баяндамаларында көрсетілген еуразияшылдық концепция туралы академиялық пікірталасты, идеологияны жандандырды. Бұл мақалада еуразияшылдық терең талданды, өйткені жылдар бойы кітапханаларда «көмілген» бұл идеология Ресей билігінің ең жоғары ауқымын жаулап алды. Еуразияшылдық, сондай-ақ Қазақстан мен Украинадағы интервенция Шығыстағы саяси әріптес Қытай Халық Республикасының болуымен және қолдауымен нығайды.

Түйін сөздер: Еуразия, Орталық Азия, ҰҚШҰ, еуразияшылдық, Қазақстан, Украина, ЕАЭО, Ресей.