

AN ANALYSIS ON THE FORMATION OF JADIDISM IN CENTRAL ASIA IN THE LATE XIXTH AND EARLY XXTH CENTURY (1870-1917)

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Abstract. This study examines the history of the Jadid movement starting from socio-cultural condition to the emergence of Jadid movement in Central Asia between the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. In order to reach the conclusion about the Jadid movement that it has been formed as religious-cultural and anti-colonial movement against the Soviet regime, this paper analyses the contest between the traditional Islam scholars and reform minded intellectuals on the reform ideas. While Khalid argues that the Jadid movement emerged as a cultural and political movement, this paper by examining the Jadidist movement in Central Asia, suggests by adding to the argument of Khalid, that it was formed as a religious-cultural movement. This is because Islam was embedded in the socio-cultural and political life of Central Asian Muslims, and Islam played an integral part in the national identity matter which is inseparable. In other words, Islam was a key marker of Central Asian Muslims identity. The argument proposed in the study asserts that the Jadid movement, despite its inclination towards secularism and high emphasis on the secular subjects, never detached from the idea of Islam; that is, the Jadids attempted to merge Islam with science and achieve the bygone Islamic civilization and culture of the Golden Age. Thus, throughout the study, it is continually demonstrated that while striving for progress and achievement in the economic and social domains, the Jadids always attempted to preserve Islamic values.

Key words: Jadidism, Central Asia, Modernity, Qadimism, Islam.

Introduction

The end of the nineteenth century witnessed the appearance of the cultural enlightenment movement of Jadidism in Central Asia [1, p. 24]. This movement, instigated by the Jadids, sought to improve the lives of those living in the Turkestan area by improving literacy and reducing stagnation and other hindrances. However, they encountered obstacles in achieving their aims of reform and progress. The Jadids wanted to bring about change by adapting Islam to new conditions – still preserving the basis of Islam, but reforming it to better meet the needs of society and rejecting the traditional customs and superstitions [2, p. 124]. Although numerous investigations have been conducted on this topic, since the collapse of the USSR, many Western scholars have shown a deep interest in studying Jadidism [3, p. 318]. However, despite a plethora of archives and historical narrative materials being available, due to strict Soviet control, many scientific articles and studies on the Jadid movement are biased and fail to remain impartial. Even though many studies have been carried out in this area, views about the movement are particularly divergent. For example, some researchers such as Eden, Sartori and DeWeese suggest that Jadidism was a rather disorganised movement consisting of a few disparate individuals or small groups; however, conversely, other accounts describe the movement as being highly organised and efficient in its actions. For Khalid, organisation of the Jadid movement was impeccable, evidenced by the way they structured educational reform, their systematic development of curricula, and their weekly newspaper publications. With regards to contextualising the religion used by the Jadids, scholars have provided a range of explanations. According to Carrière d'Encausse [4, p. 285], the Jadids followed something closely resembling Wahhabism, but her view is in the minority. For Bennigsen and Wimbush [5, p. 56], the Jadids were more nationalistic than religious *per se*, and perhaps this lent them some distance from Islam. Lazzarini [6, p. 158] carried out much research into the Jadids, and asserts that both epistemologically and intellectually, the movement broke with Islamic norms; and finally, Khalid is of the belief that the Jadids were more or less secular. However, in his later work, Khalid does recognise that there were religious elements to the movement – and loosely associates these with Wahhabism – but he maintains that the drive of the Jadids towards reform and modernity separates them from previous movements for Islamic reform [1, p. 68]. Further, Eden, Sartori and DeWeese claim that the Jadids' actions in relation to religion were not at all new or original. What was novel among the Jadids, however, was their particular context in a historical sense, as well as the influence of European thinking. This was then enhanced by the superiority of the Russian Empire's military, technological, and economic capabilities over those of Central Asian communities, and due to this, the Jadids

were great advocates of modernising language, simplifying script, and reforming education to make it more accessible for people in their communities. The abovementioned scholarly overview suggests that there is a need to explore the intellectual history of Central Asia from its religious, sociocultural, and political perspectives. Therefore, in order to achieve this objective, the first chapter of this work will be dedicated to reviewing the sociocultural and political condition of Central Asia. Then, the Qadimist (conservative Islam) movement will be examined in answering questions such as what was the Qadimist, traditional Islam movement, and why did they oppose the reform ideas proposed by Jadids? This will be followed by exploration of the emergence of the Jadid movement in addressing the question as to whether the movement was religious or secular.

Methodology

This article examines the history of the Jadid movement starting from socio-cultural condition to the emergence of Jadid movement in Central Asia between at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century.

The solution of the research tasks is based on the extensive research of scientists in this field, the general methodology of scientific knowledge. Also, the methods of comparative-historical and historical-philosophical analysis were widely used in the article.

Sociocultural and Political Situation in Central Asia

In the nineteenth century, Central Asia, in terms of sociocultural and political conditions, remained very underdeveloped in comparison to other countries [7, p. 235]. Prior to the invasion of Russia, the political and cultural life of the residents of Central Asia did not vary significantly from that of the settled and nomadic communities of other parts of the Muslim world [8, p. 85]. These countries of Central Asia were backward feudalisms governed by khans and emirs, and Islam was the main source of political legitimation [9, p. 10]. Although the justice system was built on Islamic laws (*shariah*) and the customary laws (*adat*) [3, p. 318], in reality, the rulers and their subservient officials generally did not follow the legal norms and principles and the rulers of Khanates were exploitative and cruel [9, p. 11]. Carley cited in DeWeese [10, p. 34], an analyst of contemporary affairs in Central Asian countries, regarding the condition of Central Asia in nineteenth century, asserts that the society and economy of the region were fundamentally feudal, with few changes even over a period of several hundred years and the social, political and economic state

was “bolstered by an extremely conservative cleric” that is Muslim clergy. This argument suggests that the traditional Islamic scholars (*ulema*) seem to have played a major role in the sociocultural and political domain of the government; here, the *ulema* held an enormous sway over the rulers and ordinary people as well [11, p. 162]. In the same vein, Khalid claims that, since the *ulema* were considered as the carriers of true knowledge and the heirs of Islamic knowledge, consulting with them was necessary, and even the rulers and emirs would listen to their advice in governing the country, suggesting that the relationship between rulers and Islamic scholars was well established. By elaborating on the influential position of *ulema* [1, p. 300], Khalid states that in times of state weakness, *ulema* could exercise their power independently. For example, in the fifteenth century in Samarkand, Khoja Akhrar, a prominent Islamic scholar, was an important player in both the political and social aspects of the city, and Jubari Khodja in Bukhara amassed an enormous amount of influence, both politically and in terms of wealth, during the Shaybanid period in fifteenth century [12, p. 534]. The *ulema* ruled independently in Tashkent for most of the eighteenth century. In other periods, the rulers revered the *ulema* and gave them positions of high importance and provided them with tax benefits [13, p. 5]. They were also given control over considerable amounts of secured endowment (*waqf*) property and patronage of *madrasas* and *khanakas* [14, p. 255]. This historical evidence indicates that the *ulema* were more likely to have a tremendous impact on the rulers and had a close relationship with them, and there is evidence suggesting that intermarriage occurred between the leading *ulema* families and the ruling dynasties in the nineteenth century, cementing their relationship [15, p. 5]. This demonstrates that the *ulema* had close connections with exploitative and cruel rulers, spending much of their time with them and forgetting about Islam and its commandments – meaning that they were more likely to support the rulers despite their unjust behaviour and oppressive treatment of the people. In response, the rulers supported the *ulema* as well. For example, according to Kulakhmetov, Shah Murad, an influential ruler, was apparently under the influence of the sheikh prior to his ascension to the throne, and it is alleged that his murders of the *kushbegi* (mayor) and *kazi* (judge) of Bukhara were triggered by his nervousness, as well as his moral decadence in smoking, and also his tendency to oppress. Kulakhmetov explains that during Shah Murad’s reign, a shopkeeper was killed by Akhund’s son for being disrespectful to him. The shopkeeper’s father applied to the *emir* for justice for his son, however the *emir* was incensed at the fact that the shopkeeper had been rude to Akhund’s son and, instead, fined the father. In addition, he told the father that had the shopkeeper not been killed, he would have had him thrown from a high building [15, p. 6]. Moreover, Mir Haydar, an influential ruler, described as having a scientific temperament (*mullah tabiat*), because he had

spent a lot of time in scientific conversations with *ulema*. This, however did not prevent him from falling in love with women and entering into many marriages. This shows that the improper conduct and non-adherence of the rulers and the *ulema* to the true essence of Islam seemed to have instigated a sense of resentment of the Jadids towards them, and therefore they were labelled as traitors of Islam. They were considered to be the main cause for the decline of the socio-political situation in Central Asia, where once it was a civilized and prosperous region that produced eminent scholars such as Farabi, Biruni, and Ibn Sina [8, p. 15]. For example, according to Fitrat, a well-known Jadid, the reason for the decline of the Muslim world to such low levels was the popularity of tyrannical rulers, poets who falsely praised them, and the *eshons* (spiritual guides) and *mullahs* (clergy) who sold their faith, suggesting that instead of guiding the cruel rulers to act and behave according to the scriptural sources of Islam, the *ulema* were subservient and seemed to become the slaves of affluence and high positions. For example, the following analysis provided by Munawwar Qari, the leading Jadid figure in Tashkent, shows the decline of Central Asia clearly, in which he states that more than a hundred years ago, fissures started to appear in the walls of the nation (*millat*). This was due to the moral decrepitude of Islamic scholars (*ulema*) and rulers (*umara*). He goes on to explain that working for the nation was now delimited to taking women, and banishing or executing virtuous men of religion. The rulers had forgotten about the nation or the law (*Sharia*), and prohibited activities such as drinking, gambling, pederasty, and indulgence became common among the people [1, p. 25]. Finally, these despicable deeds, according to Munawwar Qari, resulted in the lands being seized and their condition being despised and humiliated. Moreover, he contends that ignorance engenders moral and sexual decadence and leads to political and social degeneration [1, p. 26]. With regards to the education system that had been run by *ulema*, this was said to be scholastic and the students and teachers alike were ignorant of worldly knowledge such as medicine, hygiene, and math that were required in order to meet the standard of modern times. As another example, Khalid, writing about the conditions in Central Asian states, cites the following case where Mehmed Zahir Bigiev, a Tatar Jadid teacher, upon travelling in 1893, discovered himself surrounded by backwardness and ignorance. Mehmed further states that students who attended the well-known *madradas* in Samarqand and Bukhara stunned him with how ignorant they were to the outside world, indicating that the students were not aware of the progress and the latest achievements of education, due to the lack of secular subjects and the emphasis upon religious education which was mostly based on the principle of *taqlid* (Imitation). This curbed reasoning and explanations, indicating that authentic Islam was misinterpreted by *ulema*, meaning that it was due to the strict adherence to the principle of *taqlid* that Central

Asian Muslims fell into such deplorable conditions. For example, Muslim clerics opposed any changes to the education system by arguing that scientific innovations and modernity were against Islam. Abdurrauf Fitrat, a leading Jadid, while living in Istanbul, published an account of an Indian Muslim who travelled to Bukhara during his *hajj* that represents an austere indictment of the current state of Bukhara [1, p. 39]. The Indian Muslim was shocked by what he witnessed: disorder and chaos in the streets, messy, unhealthy water in the city, saint veneration at tombs, obliviousness among the *ulema*, and a dearth of organisation on the part of the government. The provided accounts imply that the Central Asian states had descended into such appalling conditions, that the described conditions were indeed contradictory to Islam, where the cleanliness, order, and the health of people were of significant priority. The accounts of the Indian Traveller provided above present a register of the defects determined by the Jadids in their society. For example, Barthold, a renowned Russian historian, rightly noted that, in the nineteenth century, when Europe claimed cultural and intellectual supremacy, Turkestan remained the lowest of all Muslim lands from a cultural and educational perspective. Reinforcing the assertion of Barthold, Khalid provides the following quote in his research from the renowned French academic Charles Seignobos regarding how glorious medieval Islamic civilization was, before having the traveller tell his hosts: “The behaviour of your self-proclaimed *ulema* is why your nation became extinct. Nevertheless, there’s no need to mourn, brother, as many other *ulema* also behave in a similar manner, not just yours. The truth is, *ulema* have committed similar crimes all over the Muslim world over the last three hundred years” [2, p. 255]. His argument regarding the derelict state of the Central Asian countries shows that the Islamic scholars *ulema* were seen by contemporaries as one of the reasons for the countries’ decline, implying that the benighted *ulema*, an exploitative rule of the Khans and emirs, led the country to decline both socially and politically. As long as the old order was allowed to continue unchecked, *madradas* were seen to make sense, share useful knowledge, and promote social order. For Fitrat, the motif behind the filthiness and chaos of Central Asian municipalities was due to ignorance of modern medicine, yet more primarily of Islam. Akin to Muslim modernists of the period, Fitrat argues that modern medicine and public health matters are in complete accord with Islam and are undeniably ordered by the Quran, implying that Russians and Europeans seem to fulfil the commandments of Islam to a greater extent than Muslims. Here, the Jadids’ perception of their condition was structured by the prevailing criterion of moral decay, resulting in a social and political downfall that formed the Central Asian outlook of history for centuries. For instance, as Behbudi [14, p. 125] contends, individuals without knowledge and dexterity are deprived of their affluence and possessions, just as their morals and honour are lost too; even their faith de-

clines. The link between the material progress of Muslims and the moral excellence of Islam, which entirely supports modern modes and skills, is constructed for the wellbeing of Islam and Muslims. It was pure ignorance on the part of conservatives to argue that Islamic law banned the attainment of modern knowledge, suggesting that progress [16, p. 226] *taraqqiyat* is linked closely to the notion of the necessity of adopting the latest scientific methods as well as the returning to the past – that is, the Golden Age of Muslims. Therefore, progress in terms of the Jadids is thus crucial for both a return to original sources of Islam and for achieving Western civilization. In other words, elucidating progress merely as ‘Westernisation’ [17, p. 545] and direct forward advancement is ambiguous according to Jadids; that is, progression is not merely movement forward, but rather movement backward towards a greater past, suggesting that the Jadids wanted to revive the life of the Golden Age of Muslims where science and religious values existed together in harmony [18, p. 75].

Qadimism: Traditional or Conservative Movement

Although Kemper and Shikhaliev [19, p. 598], in their research, show that Dudoignon in 1997 claimed that Qadimists and Jadids shared a lot in common as both emerged as a result of ‘renewal of ethics’, the concepts of both movements on education and knowledge differ significantly, suggesting the irreconcilability of these two movements both in ideology and political scale. Qadimism was against the secularisation and the reform of education, whereas the Jadids pursued the modernisation and reform of society via education [1, p. 300]. Prior to the establishment of Jadidism as a cultural and political movement, there was an organised movement known as Qadimism that consisted of conservative religious elites and scholars (*ulema*) who consistently opposed Western-based education [16, p. 226]. This movement, being organised and led by conventional religious clerics, had a strong influence on the masses. Religious symbols and slogans were used by the Qadimists in order to mobilise and manipulate illiterate people, which means in the name of religion, the Qadimists sought to perpetuate their own interest [14, p. 126]. Their religious ideology was based upon the Islamic scriptures, the Quran and the Hadith (the traditions of Prophet Muhammad). Supported by the emirs and khans, the Qadimists labelled any sociocultural change as un-Islamic [14, p. 127]. For example, the Qadimists denounced new-method education by asserting that it was against the customary practices surrounding the deliverance of knowledge. Fitrat’s teacher stated it simply: “These new-method educations will turn our children into infidels (*kafir*)”. In December 1913, the clerics at the *Ulugh Bek* mosque in Samarqand stated during a Friday gathering that new-method education and studying Russian contradicted the *shariah* – that is, the principle of Islam, and

that people who chose to send their children to one of these new-method schools became infidels [14, p. 125]. This evidence demonstrates that the traditional Islamic scholars – that is, Qadimists – totally opposed the reformation and the new-method schooling by arguing that it was against Islam, posing the question of why conservative scholars opposed the reformation. In addressing this question, Chatterjee claims that the traditional clerics showed resentment to the change due to the fact that they could lose their prestige and reputation. Although this movement is delineated negatively for opposing innovations, some Qadimists were against the terms ‘Qadimist’ or ‘Qadimism’. According to Dudoignon [20, p. 208], the Qadimists (the proponents of the old method) made an effort to preserve the unity of Muslim society at a time of dramatic transformations, suggesting that some Qadimists considered themselves as *din tutucilar* (the protectors of religion) or those on the path of ancestors (*salaf*) [21, p. 92]. This claim suggests that this coordinated movement emerged as a resistance to the innovations and new-method education of Jadids with the aim of the protection of traditional Islam. However, Khalid (1998) contends that the main issue of the Qadimists with the Jadids was neither with their new-method schools nor their reformation. He goes on to elaborate that the resentment of the Qadimist towards the Jadids emanated from their fear of the intrinsic supremacy of the new-method school [1, p. 156], for it would announce to the world their own ignorance of the *ulema*, suggesting that the problems seem to be not with the approach of new-method schools, as the *ulema* did not fervently challenge the Russo-native schools that had a similar curriculum. Furthermore, despite the rapid spread and prosperity of the new-method schools, they were eventually shut down at the request of Qadimists, and some schools fell prey to policies of the Qadimists that had little to do with new-method education. However, in a different vein, Dudoignon argues that the fundamental aspect of the issue, as illustrated by Tuqtar, consisted in the shortage of stable income for the imams who worked in the traditional *maktab*, and whose material condition relied heavily on the wealth and the *waqf* endowment. The arrival of a Muslim teacher, and the establishment of a reformed new-method Jadid school, could lead to a more or less substantial loss of income for the *maktab* adjacent to the mosque [20, p. 208]. This argument suggests that Qadimism was thus not a self-conscious movement, and indeed as Dudoignon claims, it was mainly financial concerns, rather than ideological or religious opposition, that launched the opposition to new-method schools. This is supported by Komatsu [22, p. 136], who maintains that the Sunni clergy were fearful of losing endowment (*waqf*) property and attacked the reformist movements. However, it should be noted that labelling all the *ulema* as a benighted group, as they are frequently depicted, is incorrect. For example, Behbudi and Munawwar Qari, who acquired knowledge at the *madrassa*, kept personal relationships with renowned *ulema*.

Allworth for example, in delineating the Qadimists as being controlled from within by permanent tradition and inflexible rules, claims that strict conservative clerics and executives, who had trouble envisaging that they could gain anything of value from Jadid ideas, did indeed embrace them [23, p. 236]. In fact, the Jadids were ambivalent about being separated from their opponents. Others participating in Jadid matters were attached to the *madrasa* environment to an even greater degree. Sayid Ahmad Wasli (1870-1920) wrote numerous poems praising the new method, and in 1915 was appointed as a teacher in a madrasa named Hazrat-I Shah. These examples indicate that some of the Qadimist *ulema* supported the strategy of the Jadids in reforming the schools. Despite the fact that al-Islah newspaper was hostile to Jadidism's central tenets, it did contain a number of discussions regarding the reformation of *madrastas* by submitting some proposals. The proposal, presented by a *mudarris* from Bukhara, offered a curriculum to span fifteen years, covering two subjects that were taught every year. Such proposals would have converted *madrasa* into schools, adopting a fixed curriculum, marks and exams. The discrepancy between the revivalist *ulema* and the Jadids is significant, as it indicates an important feature of Jadidism. Many Western academics and researchers have tried to consider the Jadid movement in the local Muslim tradition of reform [1, p. 356]. According to this observation, Jadidism emerged as a result of a long contest in Bukhara *madrastas* to stop following *taqlid* (obedience to scriptural conviction) and to go back to the canonical Islamic sources instead. However, Khalid, opposing this view, argues that there is a major issue with the conflict between Jadidist thought and *taqlid*, and in fact suggests that Jadidism can be categorised as a theological or religious movement instead of a cultural reformation movement. He further states that Jadid writing did not contain any theological argumentation, even though the Jadids applied modernist theology. In a different vein, even though Fathuddin Vahabov, a leading Muslim clergyman, publicly advocated Jadidism, he made serious criticisms of the Jadids' reform strategies. According to him, the Jadids made three mistakes in struggling with Qadimists, traditional Islamic scholars. For him, firstly, Jadidists disseminated the view that tradition was bad. Secondly, Vahabov argues that instead of referring to new methods in modernising the *maktab* and *madrasa*, the Jadidists should have applied a different method such as 'training in an order'. Thirdly, Jadids emerged with a Western appearance that Muslim people disliked. These three characteristics of the Jadids were used by Qadimists against them. He further points out that the struggle between them was an error and their battle led to the decline of the religious *maktabs* and *madrasa* [21, p. 90]. It should be acknowledged that Qadimists used the old method of schooling, so due to them traditional Islamic education was preserved among the people through the mullahs who made a considerable contribution to the distribution of Islamic education

that was vital in keeping accurate Islam alive during the harsh communist regime [24, p. 780]. This suggests that labelling all Qadimists as corrupted groups of people is incorrect, as some often supported the Jadids by emulating them in their new-method education. Here, the issue is not with the *ulema*, but with the entrenched tradition of following *taqlid* (imitation), which was an obstacle to the reinterpretation of scriptures and modernisation of society. However, here arose the question regarding the nature of Jadidism: that is, whether it was religious or sociocultural in character.

The Emergence of Jadidism

While distinguished historiographical convention represents movements designed to reform Islamic communities in Central Asia as a means of reviving the ‘Golden Age of Islam’ [10, p. 29], Jadidism, according to Khalid, appeared in the late nineteenth century with a critique of conventional Muslim education. Jadidism advocated the wide-ranging transformations in many fields of communal life such as the reform of customary religious practices and the cultivation of new forms of cordiality. These elements suggest that this movement was established in order to reform Muslim society by employing up-to-date means of interaction and new forms of civility. In other words, it could be pointed out that the common characteristic which connected this lightly allied cohort of individuals might have been their positive connection with the set of ideas for reform and enlightenment, along with the new method schooling proposed by Ismail Gasprinskii, Crimean Tatar Jadid who is regarded to inspire Jadidist movement in Central Asia, the *usul-i-jadida* [25, p. 75]. However, according to Kanlidere, Jadidism emerged to religious issues such as interpretation of the scriptures, women’s position in society, and the struggle against conservatism and superstition. This view suggests that Jadidism was the result of a lengthy conflict in the Bukhara *madrasa* between the traditional Islamic religious clerics and the modernist intellectuals to cease the need to obey clerical opinion and go back to the basic fundamentals of Islam [26, p. 178]. Yet, there is plenty of evidence indicating that the Jadids, despite having gained some Islamic knowledge at the *madrasa*, were not Islamic scholars and theological dispute was noticeably absent from Central Asian Jadidism (Khalid, 1998).

Nevertheless, Lazzarini elaborating on the reformation of Gasprinskii, has underscored that Gasprinskii, while calling for reformation, chose to utilise the term *tanzimat*, a word that was used to describe the reforms in the Ottoman Empire [6, p. 155]. The type of schools Gasprinskii offered were called *muntazam-maktablar*. The precise etymology of *tanzim* would be ‘improvement’, ‘placing in order’, ‘arranging in a solid manner’. *Muntazam*, irrespective of its authentic etymology, was used in the Crimean and Volga Tatar instead of the

term ‘modern’, indicating that Gasprinskii possibly had the intention, while initiating the reform, of putting Muslim society in order, modernising it, and enabling it so that it could meet the requirements of the modern day. Despite the fact that Gasprinskii had little profound knowledge of conventional Islamic study, he was indeed cognisant of the fact that in its glory days, Islamic education comprised secular subjects such as geography, mathematics, and physics, and he frequently reminded the traditional Muslim opponents of Jadids of their remarkable scholarly past. However, Baldauf argues that the Jadid movement initiated by Gasprinskii did not make any effort to revive bygone glory days, and Jadid movement as Lazzarini asserts, did not aim to restore what was perceived as an original, idyllic earlier period in history [25, p. 75]. This implies that Gasprinskii did not support *tajdid*, as it was generally comprehended as ‘renewal’ [27, p. 186]. Eventually, the typical method of *tajdid* was not applied, that would be *islah* [25, p. 76]. *Islah* denotes renovation and restoration, the replacement of rotten elements for healthy and solid ones to re-establish the former stable condition. *Islah* would have intended to re-establish the environments prevalent during the Golden Age of Islam [25, p. 77]. *Tajdid* and *islah* are regressive rather than progressive as they put forward the supremacy of the past and endeavour to revive it. Therefore, it could be assumed that the worldview of Jadids contained progressive features, and the reform they established strove for the betterment of their present conditions and even exerted much effort to be better than that of any bygone period. Although this account demonstrates that the Jadidism project did not contain religious features, suggesting they were not religious movement, Bennigsen’s research shows that the Jadid movement emerged as a religious movement opposing the customary practices and traditions of the Central Asian people that were deemed contradictory to authentic Islam. In the same vein, DeWeese in his article in addressing issues related to the religiosity or religion within Jadidism, claims that the Jadids has a great deal in common with fundamentalism. Further, he goes on to elaborate on fundamentalism with its call for individual involvement with textuality, and its denial of cumulative tradition authorised by communal ratification rather than by canonical literalism [10, p. 35]. It must be acknowledged that religious fundamentalism overlaps significantly with the concept of modernity, and fits well with Wahhabism and Salafism, suggesting that the religious profile of Jadidism might have parallels with the concept of Wahhabism. Moreover, it is historically known that Ismail Gaspirali, who is the founder of Jadidism, travelled extensively in the Muslim world and had even met with Muhammed Abduh, who is regarded by some to be the founder of Islamic reformism. This tends to assume that Gaspirali, possibly being inspired by Abduh, sought to create the reformist movement based on Pan-Islamic ideology. Although Khalid, in a slightly different manner, asserts that Jadids could not have been a secularist movement

as they frequently sought to justify their claims using the Islamic faith, he says that the Jadids' apprehension of Islam was positioned exactly in a desacralised world with progression at its core. This implies that the central concepts in Jadidism were 'progress' (*taraqqiyat*) and 'civilization' (*madaniyat*), and were incorporated into their understanding of Islam to generate a dynamically modernist interpretation of Islam, meaning that the understanding and the practice of Islam seems to be different. If so, this provokes the question of how Islam was envisioned in their understanding, and this leads to examine the causes and the peculiarities of the Jadid movement from a different perspective. For example, Khalid argues that Jadidism was a well-structured and impeccably organised movement that emerged as a sociocultural and political movement. In elaborating on Jadidism from the cultural angle, cites the following exhortation compiled by Munawwar Qari, a leading Jadid:

O Co-religionists, o compatriots! Let's be just and compare our situation with that of other, advanced nations. Let's secure the future of our coming generations and save them from becoming slaves and servants of others. The Europeans, taking advantage of our negligence and ignorance, took our government from our hands, and are gradually taking over our crafts and trades. If we do not quickly make an effort to reform our affairs in order to safeguard ourselves, our nation, and our children, our future will be extremely difficult. Reform begins with a rapid start in cultivating sciences conforming to our times. Becoming acquainted with the sciences of the present age depends upon the reform of our schools and our methods of teaching.

As this passage demonstrates, Jadidism seems to have emerged as a religious-cultural and anti-colonial movement and against the ignorance and backwardness of the Muslim countries that lagged behind Western countries. Moreover, this stresses the importance of political and educational issues rather than mere religious ones – which is, again, indicative of the religious-cultural and political significance of Jadidism. According to Bazarbayev and Adilbekova [16, p. 230], there were two main issues that resulted in the establishment of Jadidism in the region: firstly, conventional society's inability to self-renew, leading to the decline of social progress. The second reason was due to the colonial supremacy of Tsarist Russia, that aimed at indigenising the native people by Russifying them and undermining their customs and traditions. This type of reform seems to have precipitated the process of integration of Turkic people. Under these conditions, Jadidism arose, the movement that intended to bring society out of ignorance and deadlock through education. The suggestion of Bazarbayev and Adilbekova regarding the cause of the emergence of Jadidism seems to be in congruence with the analysis of Khalid, who links the emergence of the Jadid movement to cultural and political reasons, suggesting that the Jadids were inspired by the desire for changes to be made and for them to

acquire cultural capital. Hence, this prompted the Jadids to think about reformation in a cultural sense, and they were able to put all of their energy into it. After all, the Jadid movement was founded as a result of their own critical discourse. Despite the fact that Jadidism was a cultural and political movement, it was also a distinctly Muslim movement as all of its constructions were derived from traditional Islamic norms in Central Asia and their claims back up by Islam. The Muslim faith was never renounced by the Jadids like it was by many young Turkish people around the same time [28, p. 230]. For them, modernity was completely consistent with the authentic essence of Islam. This suggests that Jadids, although pursuing sociocultural and political reform, never rejected Islam, but were attempting to resort to a pure Islam by reinterpreting the scriptures according to modern conditions, in which they believed the true essence of Islam to lie in modernity.

Conclusion

As has been expressed in the introduction, the exploration of the Jadids from the perspective of historical, socio-cultural, religious and political in a historical-chronological order has been conducted and based on the evidences and historical facts provided throughout the research, this study has proposed that the Jadidism has been formed as a not only cultural and political movement as Khalid argued but religious-cultural and anti-colonial movement and resistance against the Soviet colony. Throughout the research it has been demonstrated that the Jadidism as a religious-cultural and political movement has managed to succeed in reestablishing the state order of Central Asia by contesting with the conservative system and the traditional *ulema* in battling the ignorance through new-method schools, meanwhile retaining the Islamic religion. This study has found out that the cultural transformation and the modernization of the indigenous community through the transformation of the societal order attained via the reformation of the conventional patterns of education was aspired by the Jadids. In this sense, the Jadids have pursued the new Muslim intellectual cohort who would be more inclined towards the secular sciences than with religious studies. In this revivalist sense, the Jadids called for a reform that was entrenched in a rigorist discourse on correcting Muslim practice. Most Central Asian traditional *ulema* was mainly focused on a concept of reform that pursued a reorganization of Muslim ethics and the readjustment of Muslims' cultural capital. It is thus complicated to arrive at a precise assessment of the Jadid's position. It is undeniable fact that the Jadids sought more engineers and fewer clerics, yet, they did not imagine a totally secular Muslim community, that is, Muslims living without applying the sharia Islamic law. In the expression of Khalid, *shariat* has been at the core in the Jadid political strategy for a

sovereign Turkestan from Soviet Empire. Although it can be claimed that they were defeated and consequently persecuted by the Soviet brutally, owing to the vigorous effort of Jadids, Central Asian states were able to attain the economic and social prosperity meanwhile preserve the Islamic religion.

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XIX ғасырдың аяғы мен XX ғасырдың басында (1870-1917 жж.) Орталық Азияда жәдидизмнің қалыптасуын талдау

Аңдатпа. Бұл зерттеуде XIX ғасырдың соңы мен XX ғасырдың басындағы Орталық Азиядағы жәдидтік қозғалыстың пайда болуына элеуметтік-мәдени жағдайдан бастап, жәдидтік қозғалыстың тарихы зерттеледі. Жәдид қозғалысы туралы оның кеңестік билікке қарсы діни, мәдени және отаршылдыққа қарсы қозғалыс ретінде пайда болғаны туралы қорытынды жасау үшін бұл мақалада дәстүрлі ислам ғалымдары мен реформаторлық зиялылар арасындағы реформалық идеялар арасындағы бәсекелестікке талдау жасалады. Халид жәдидтік қозғалыстың мәдени-саяси қозғалыс ретінде пайда болғанын дәлелдесе, Орталық Азиядағы жәдидтік қозғалысты қарастыратын бұл мақалада оның діни-мәдени қозғалыс ретінде пайда болғандығы туралы Халидтің дәлелдеріне толықтыру енгізу ұсынылды. Бұл Орталық Азиядағы мұсылмандардың элеуметтік-мәдени және саяси өміріне исламның еніп кетуіне байланысты және ислам діні бір-бірінен ажырамас ұлттық бірегейлік мәселесінде ажырамас рөл атқарды. Басқаша айтқанда, ислам Орталық Азия мұсылмандары үшін басты бірегейлендіру белгісі болды. Зерттеуде алға тартылған дәлелде жәдидтік қозғалыс өзінің зайырлы бағыттылығы мен зайырлы тақырыптарға үлкен мән бергеніне қарамастан, ешқашан ислам идеясынан ажырамағаны; яғни жәдидшілер исламды ғылыммен ұштастырып, өткен ислам өркениеті мен алтын ғасыр мәдениетіне жетуге тырысты. Осылайша, бүкіл зерттеу барысында жәдиттердің экономикалық және элеуметтік салаларда ілгерілеу мен жетістіктерге ұмтылып, әрқашан ислам құндылықтарын сақтауға тырысқаны көрсетілді.

Түйін сөздер: жәдидизм, Орталық Азия, қазіргі заман, қадимизм, ислам.

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Анализ становления джадидизма в Центральной Азии в конце XIX-начале XX века (1870-1917)

Аннотация. В данном исследовании рассматривается история движения джадидов, начиная с социокультурных условий и заканчивая возникновением движения джадидов в Центральной Азии в период с конца девятнадцатого века по начало двадцатого века. Чтобы сделать вывод о движении джадидов о том, что оно сформировалось как религиозно-культурное и антиколониальное движение против советского режима, в данной статье анализируется соперничество между учеными традиционного ислама и интеллектуалами, настроенными на реформы, в отношении идей реформы. В то время, как Халид утверждает, что движение джадидов возникло как культурное и политическое движение, в этой статье, исследуя движение джадидов в Центральной Азии, предлагается добавить к аргументу Халида, что оно сформировалось как религиозно-культурное движение. Это связано с тем, что ислам был встроен в социально-культурную и политическую жизнь мусульман Центральной Азии и ислам играл неотъемлемую роль в вопросе национальной идентичности, которая неотделима. Другими словами, ислам был ключевым маркером идентичности мусульман Центральной Азии. Аргумент, предложенный в исследовании, утверждает, что движение джадидов, несмотря на его склонность к секуляризму и высокий акцент на светские темы, никогда не отрывалось от идеи ислама; то есть джади́ды пытались объединить ислам с наукой и достичь исламской цивилизации и культуры Золотого века. Таким образом, на протяжении всего исследования постоянно демонстрируется, что, стремясь к прогрессу и достижениям в экономической и социальной сферах, джади́ды всегда пытались сохранить исламские ценности.

Ключевые слова: джадидизм, Центральная Азия, современность, кадимизм, ислам.