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PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF IGNORANCE: EPISTEMOLOGICAL, ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES

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Abstract. This article examines ignorance as a philosophical phenomenon that extends beyond the simple absence of knowledge and encompasses epistemological, ethical, and social dimensions of human existence. The study aims to conceptualize ignorance as a complex condition influencing the ways individuals perceive reality, evaluate information, make moral judgments, and participate in social life. The theoretical framework draws upon Socratic reflections on the recognition of one's own ignorance, Plato's allegory of the cave, Enlightenment rationalism, and contemporary approaches to epistemic responsibility. Particular attention is given to the distinction between passive ignorance, resulting from a lack of access to knowledge, and active ignorance, which involves the conscious rejection, avoidance, or denial of available evidence. The article also considers the transformation of ignorance in the digital environment, where misinformation, algorithmic filtering, information overload, and epistemic fragmentation create new challenges for knowledge production and public communication. The analysis suggests that overcoming ignorance requires not merely the accumulation of information but also critical thinking, intellectual humility, epistemic responsibility, and a continuous willingness to question established assumptions.

Keywords: ignorance, philosophy, epistemology, knowledge, truth, critical thinking, epistemic responsibility, digital society.

Introduction

Ignorance has occupied a significant but often paradoxical position in the history of philosophy. At first glance, ignorance appears to be simply the absence of knowledge:

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a person is ignorant of something because they do not possess sufficient information about it. However, philosophical reflection reveals that ignorance is considerably more complex. It may concern not only what a person does not know but also what they believe they know, what they refuse to know, what they are unable to recognize, and what they deliberately exclude from their field of attention. Consequently, ignorance should not be understood merely as an intellectual deficiency. It can also be considered an epistemological condition, an ethical problem, a social phenomenon, and, under particular circumstances, a mechanism through which power and social inequality are reproduced. The philosophical significance of ignorance becomes particularly visible when it is contrasted with knowledge. Knowledge is traditionally associated with truth, justification, rationality, and the capacity to distinguish reliable claims from false or unsupported ones. Ignorance, by contrast, is frequently represented as the opposite of knowledge. Yet this binary opposition is insufficient for understanding the complexity of human cognition. Between complete knowledge and complete ignorance lies a broad spectrum of uncertainty, doubt, misunderstanding, incomplete information, prejudice, cognitive limitation, and false certainty. A person may possess a large amount of information while remaining epistemically ignorant if they lack the ability to evaluate its reliability or understand its broader implications. Therefore, the problem of ignorance is inseparable from the philosophical question of how human beings know what they claim to know. One of the earliest and most influential approaches to this problem can be found in the philosophy of Socrates. The Socratic recognition of one's own ignorance represents an important turning point in the history of epistemological thought. Socrates did not treat ignorance exclusively as an intellectual weakness. Instead, recognizing one's limitations could become the starting point for philosophical inquiry. The awareness that one does not possess certain knowledge creates the possibility of questioning, dialogue, reflection, and intellectual development. From this perspective, ignorance has an ambiguous character. Unrecognized ignorance can prevent learning, whereas acknowledged ignorance can motivate the search for knowledge.

The philosophical value of ignorance therefore depends partly on the subject's relationship to their own cognitive limitations. Plato further developed the relationship between ignorance and knowledge through the allegory of the cave. The prisoners in the cave perceive shadows and initially regard them as reality. Their problem is not simply that they lack information. Rather, their entire framework for interpreting reality is restricted. The movement from darkness toward the outside world represents a difficult transformation of consciousness, involving education, intellectual struggle, and the gradual recognition that previously accepted assumptions may be false or incomplete. The allegory demonstrates that ignorance can be structural: individuals may remain within a particular epistemic framework because they have never been encouraged or enabled to question it. Knowledge, consequently, is not merely the accumulation of facts but also the transformation of one's relationship to reality. This philosophical perspective remains relevant in contemporary society. Modern individuals have unprecedented access to information, yet increased access to information does not automatically result in increased knowledge. The digital environment provides users with enormous quantities of data, opinions, interpretations, images, and competing claims. Search engines, social

media platforms, video-sharing services, and algorithmically personalized news feeds can create the impression that information is universally accessible. Nevertheless, accessibility and meaningful understanding are not identical. A person may encounter thousands of pieces of information without possessing the methodological or critical skills necessary to evaluate them. In this context, ignorance may emerge not from informational scarcity but from informational abundance.

The contemporary transformation of ignorance is particularly important because digital communication changes the conditions under which individuals encounter knowledge. Algorithms frequently organize information according to previous behavior, interests, engagement patterns, and predicted preferences. As a result, users may repeatedly encounter similar perspectives while having limited exposure to alternative interpretations. Such environments can contribute to epistemic fragmentation, in which different groups develop substantially different understandings of the same social reality. Ignorance in this context is not necessarily caused by an absence of information. It may result from selective exposure, fragmented attention, confirmation bias, or the rejection of information that conflicts with established beliefs. Another important dimension of ignorance concerns the relationship between knowledge and power. Throughout the history of social thought, knowledge has been connected to institutions, authority, education, cultural capital, and mechanisms of social inclusion and exclusion. Not all individuals have equal access to educational resources, reliable information, scientific knowledge, or opportunities for intellectual development. Therefore, ignorance can have structural causes. Economic inequality, educational disparities, linguistic barriers, technological limitations, and unequal access to cultural resources can influence what individuals are able to know. From this perspective, analyzing ignorance requires moving beyond an exclusively individualistic approach and examining the social conditions that shape the distribution of knowledge. Ignorance also has an ethical dimension. The question is not simply whether an individual knows something but whether they have a responsibility to know it.

In everyday life, people make decisions that affect other individuals, communities, and institutions. Some forms of ignorance are unavoidable because human knowledge is necessarily limited. No individual can know everything. However, there is a significant distinction between unavoidable ignorance and deliberate ignorance. The former results from the finite nature of human cognition, whereas the latter may involve refusing to examine evidence, avoiding inconvenient information, or maintaining a belief despite strong reasons for reconsidering it. This distinction introduces the concept of epistemic responsibility. Intellectual humility is consequently an important condition for overcoming problematic forms of ignorance. Intellectual humility does not mean rejecting one's own knowledge or treating all claims as equally valid. Rather, it involves recognizing the limits of one's understanding, remaining open to correction, evaluating evidence carefully, and distinguishing confidence from certainty. In this sense, philosophical education can contribute to the development of an epistemic attitude that combines critical inquiry with awareness of cognitive limitations. The problem becomes especially significant in contemporary public communication. Political, social, scientific, and cultural discussions increasingly take place in digital

spaces where information circulates rapidly and where emotional or provocative content may receive greater attention than carefully contextualized information. In such circumstances, ignorance can be reproduced through repetition, selective framing, simplification, and the normalization of unsupported claims. At the same time, it would be inappropriate to assume that every individual exposed to misinformation is simply "ignorant." People encounter information within specific social, cultural, linguistic, and technological contexts. Therefore, a philosophical analysis should examine both individual cognitive responsibility and the broader structures through which information is produced and distributed. Another important issue is the relationship between ignorance and uncertainty.

Modern science itself demonstrates that knowledge is often provisional and open to revision. Scientific inquiry does not eliminate uncertainty; rather, it develops methods for managing uncertainty through evidence, verification, criticism, and methodological transparency. Consequently, acknowledging uncertainty should not be confused with ignorance in its negative sense. On the contrary, recognizing the limits of current knowledge can be a sign of epistemic maturity. This distinction is particularly important in an era when individuals may demand absolute certainty from complex scientific and social questions. The study of ignorance therefore requires an interdisciplinary philosophical approach combining epistemology, ethics, social philosophy, philosophy of education, and contemporary digital theory. Such an approach allows ignorance to be analyzed at several interconnected levels: the individual level of cognition, the interpersonal level of communication, the institutional level of knowledge production, and the societal level of information distribution. These dimensions demonstrate that ignorance is not simply a passive state waiting to be replaced by knowledge. It can be produced, maintained, normalized, challenged, and transformed.

The relevance of this research is determined by the growing complexity of the contemporary information environment. The expansion of digital technologies has made knowledge more accessible while simultaneously creating new forms of epistemic uncertainty. Individuals must increasingly determine which sources deserve trust, distinguish evidence from opinion, recognize manipulation, and revise previously held assumptions. Under these conditions, the philosophical investigation of ignorance becomes essential for understanding the relationship between knowledge, truth, freedom, responsibility, and social interaction.

The purpose of this study is therefore to examine ignorance as a multidimensional philosophical phenomenon and to identify its major epistemological, ethical, and social forms. The research focuses particularly on the distinction between the absence of knowledge and the active rejection of knowledge, as well as on the transformation of ignorance under contemporary digital conditions. The study argues that the problem of ignorance cannot be solved exclusively through the accumulation of information. A more comprehensive response requires the development of critical thinking, intellectual humility, epistemic responsibility, and the ability to engage constructively with uncertainty and competing interpretations.

Thus, ignorance should not be regarded solely as the opposite of knowledge. It is better understood as a dynamic component of human cognition and social existence.

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Sometimes it represents the starting point of philosophical inquiry; sometimes it becomes an obstacle to rational judgment; and under certain social and technological conditions, it can be actively reproduced. Understanding these different forms is essential for developing a more responsible philosophy of knowledge capable of responding to the challenges of contemporary society.

Methodology

This study employs a qualitative philosophical and interdisciplinary research methodology to examine ignorance as an epistemological, ethical, and social phenomenon. The methodological framework combines conceptual analysis, comparative philosophical analysis, hermeneutic interpretation, and critical discourse analysis. Classical philosophical approaches to ignorance and knowledge are examined through selected works by Socrates, Plato, Descartes, Kant, and contemporary epistemological theorists [1-5]. The study also considers modern approaches to epistemic injustice, agnotology, intellectual humility, and the social production of ignorance [6-10]. A comparative approach is used to identify differences between passive ignorance, structural ignorance, and actively maintained ignorance. Particular attention is given to the transformation of ignorance in digital environments, including misinformation, algorithmic personalization, information overload, and epistemic fragmentation [11-14]. The analysis proceeds through four interconnected categories: the nature of ignorance, its relationship with knowledge and truth, its ethical consequences, and its transformation under digital communication. This methodology enables the study to interpret ignorance not simply as a lack of information but as a multidimensional condition shaped by cognitive, social, cultural, and technological factors.

Results and Discussion

The first major finding of the study is that ignorance cannot be reduced to the absence of factual information. From an epistemological perspective, ignorance represents a complex relationship between the knowing subject, available evidence, justified belief, and the limits of human cognition. Philosophical traditions have repeatedly demonstrated that the question “What do we know?” cannot be separated from the question “What do we not know?” [1, 2]. The Socratic tradition provides one of the most important conceptual foundations for understanding this relationship. The recognition of one’s own ignorance can be interpreted as a form of epistemic awareness. A person who understands the limits of their knowledge is potentially more open to questioning, dialogue, and learning. In contrast, an individual who does not recognize those limits may confuse belief with knowledge. This distinction is particularly significant because false certainty can be more resistant to correction than acknowledged ignorance. Plato’s philosophical model further demonstrates that ignorance may involve not simply the absence of information but the possession of an inadequate representation of reality [2]. In the allegory of the cave, individuals interpret shadows as reality because their epistemic horizon is restricted. Their problem

is therefore structural: they do not possess the conceptual framework necessary to recognize the limitations of their perceptions. Education becomes a process of epistemic transformation through which the individual gradually develops the ability to distinguish appearance from reality. This interpretation allows ignorance to be divided into at least three broad forms. The first is uninformed ignorance, in which an individual lacks relevant information. The second is misinformed ignorance, in which a person possesses information that is inaccurate or misleading. The third is reflexive or self-aware ignorance, in which an individual recognizes the limits of their own knowledge. These forms have different philosophical implications. Uninformed ignorance is not necessarily ethically problematic.

Human beings inevitably possess limited knowledge because no individual can acquire information about every possible subject. A person may be unaware of a historical event, scientific concept, language, or cultural practice without this necessarily indicating an intellectual deficiency. Ignorance becomes more significant when the individual is required to make a judgment but lacks sufficient knowledge to do so responsibly. Misinformed ignorance is more complicated because the individual may believe that they possess knowledge. The epistemic problem is therefore not an empty space but a distorted cognitive structure. Correcting such ignorance requires more than adding information. It may require reconsidering existing assumptions, evaluating evidence, and revising established beliefs. Self-aware ignorance, by contrast, can have a productive philosophical function. Socratic inquiry demonstrates that recognizing one's limitations may encourage intellectual curiosity [1]. Contemporary theories of intellectual humility similarly emphasize the importance of recognizing that one's beliefs can be incomplete or mistaken [9]. Such humility should not be interpreted as intellectual weakness. Rather, it can strengthen the capacity for critical reasoning because the individual remains open to evidence and correction. The findings therefore suggest that ignorance exists on a continuum rather than as a simple binary opposite of knowledge. Between knowing and not knowing lie uncertainty, probability, partial understanding, misunderstanding, and justified suspension of judgment. This observation is particularly relevant to contemporary scientific discourse, where knowledge is frequently provisional and subject to revision. A second important result concerns the distinction between passive ignorance and active ignorance. Passive ignorance emerges when a person does not possess relevant knowledge, whereas active ignorance may involve the avoidance, rejection, or suppression of available knowledge.

This distinction has significant ethical implications. Not knowing something is not automatically a moral failure. However, refusing to examine information that is readily available may create a different type of responsibility. Contemporary discussions of epistemic responsibility emphasize that individuals have obligations concerning how they form, maintain, and revise beliefs [7,8].

The concept of agnotology is particularly useful for understanding this phenomenon. Agnotology examines the cultural and social production of ignorance and draws attention to situations in which ignorance is not simply discovered but

actively generated or maintained [6]. In this framework, ignorance can become an outcome of institutional practices, selective communication, strategic uncertainty, or unequal access to knowledge.

This perspective changes the traditional philosophical question. Instead of asking only "Why does a person not know?", researchers can also ask "How was this ignorance produced?" and "Who benefits from the continuation of this state of not knowing?" Such questions are especially relevant in contemporary societies where information is increasingly mediated by institutions, platforms, corporations, educational systems, and communication networks.

However, the concept of actively produced ignorance should be applied carefully. Not every disagreement, misunderstanding, or lack of knowledge is evidence of deliberate manipulation. Alternative explanations may include educational inequality, cognitive limitations, cultural differences, linguistic barriers, lack of access to reliable information, or simple uncertainty. Therefore, claims about intentional production of ignorance require empirical evidence.

Ignorance, Power, and Epistemic Injustice

The third finding concerns the relationship between ignorance and social power. Knowledge is not distributed equally across society. Access to education, scientific resources, professional expertise, technological infrastructure, and credible sources of information varies according to social and institutional conditions.

Miranda Fricker's concept of epistemic injustice provides an important framework for understanding this issue [7]. Epistemic injustice occurs when individuals or groups are disadvantaged in their capacity as knowers. One form, testimonial injustice, emerges when a person's statements receive reduced credibility because of prejudice or social stereotypes. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when individuals lack the conceptual resources needed to communicate or interpret important aspects of their experience.

These concepts demonstrate that ignorance can be relational. An individual may possess knowledge based on personal experience but encounter social conditions that prevent that knowledge from being recognized. In such circumstances, the problem is not simply that the individual lacks knowledge. Rather, the surrounding epistemic system fails to recognize, distribute, or legitimize knowledge appropriately.

This finding expands the philosophical understanding of ignorance. It indicates that knowledge should not be considered exclusively an individual possession. Knowledge is also produced through social interaction, institutions, language, education, cultural practices, and collective memory.

Pierre Bourdieu's theory of cultural capital is relevant here because educational and cultural resources influence individuals' ability to participate effectively in particular social fields [10]. Individuals who possess greater familiarity with dominant linguistic and cultural codes may find it easier to access institutions and communicate their knowledge. Consequently, ignorance may sometimes reflect unequal social conditions rather than individual intellectual limitations.

Ignorance and Intellectual Humility

Another important result concerns the role of intellectual humility in responding to ignorance. Contemporary epistemology increasingly distinguishes between confidence and certainty. A person may reasonably hold a strong belief while simultaneously acknowledging that it could be revised in light of better evidence.

Intellectual humility involves an awareness of one's cognitive limitations and a willingness to revise one's beliefs. It does not require the individual to treat every opinion as equally valid. Instead, it requires an appropriate relationship between confidence and evidence [9].

This distinction is especially important in polarized communication environments. When disagreement is interpreted as evidence of stupidity or bad faith, dialogue becomes increasingly difficult. By contrast, intellectual humility permits individuals to distinguish between disagreement about evidence, disagreement about values, and disagreement caused by different interpretations of the same information.

From this perspective, philosophy can contribute to the development of epistemic virtues. Critical thinking is not simply a set of technical skills for identifying logical errors. It also involves the capacity to ask whether one's own assumptions are justified. The philosophical attitude toward ignorance therefore combines skepticism with openness: skepticism toward unsupported claims and openness toward evidence that challenges established beliefs.

Digital Transformation of Ignorance

The emergence of digital communication introduces new dimensions to the problem of ignorance. The contemporary individual is surrounded by unprecedented quantities of information. Nevertheless, information abundance does not necessarily produce knowledge.

One of the central findings is that digital ignorance may emerge through **information overload**. When users are exposed to excessive amounts of information, they may lack the cognitive resources necessary to evaluate every claim. Consequently, individuals may rely on simplified heuristics, familiar sources, social approval, or emotionally compelling narratives.

Another mechanism is algorithmic personalization. Digital platforms frequently organize content according to user behavior and predicted preferences. This can increase the relevance of information but may also reduce exposure to perspectives outside an individual's established information environment. Research on selective exposure and online political communication has demonstrated that digital environments can contribute to fragmented information consumption [11,12].

The resulting condition can be described as **epistemic fragmentation**. Different users may inhabit substantially different informational environments even when they use the same platform. They can encounter different news stories, different interpretations, and different social communities. Consequently, disagreement may concern not only values or political preferences but also the perceived factual basis of the discussion.

This phenomenon does not mean that algorithms inevitably create ignorance. Personalized systems can also facilitate access to educational materials, scientific

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resources, specialized knowledge, and diverse perspectives. Their effects depend on platform design, user behavior, media literacy, and institutional context.

Misinformation and the Construction of False Knowledge

Misinformation presents another important dimension of contemporary ignorance. Traditional definitions of ignorance often assume that the individual possesses no relevant information. In digital environments, however, people may possess a large amount of information that is inaccurate.

This produces a paradox: information can increase while reliable knowledge decreases.

The distinction between information and knowledge is therefore fundamental. Information becomes knowledge only within processes of interpretation, verification, contextualization, and justification. A statement repeated thousands of times does not become true through repetition alone.

Research on misinformation has demonstrated that false claims can persist even after corrective information becomes available [13,14]. One reason is that individuals may incorporate information into existing belief structures. Another is that emotionally salient information may be easier to remember and share than complex contextual explanations.

This suggests that combating ignorance cannot be reduced to simply providing more information. Effective epistemic education must develop the ability to evaluate sources, distinguish evidence from assertion, recognize uncertainty, and understand the mechanisms through which information is produced and distributed.

Ignorance and Education

The findings also demonstrate the central role of education. Classical philosophy already connected education with the movement from ignorance toward knowledge [2]. Contemporary educational theory expands this relationship by emphasizing critical thinking, media literacy, reflective judgment, and independent inquiry.

Education should therefore not merely transmit established facts. It should teach individuals how knowledge is constructed, evaluated, challenged, and revised. This is particularly important in digital societies, where students encounter information from sources with very different standards of reliability.

A philosophically informed model of education would include at least four components: factual knowledge, methodological literacy, critical evaluation, and intellectual self-reflection. Factual knowledge provides the foundation for understanding. Methodological literacy allows individuals to determine how claims were produced. Critical evaluation enables them to assess evidence. Intellectual self-reflection allows them to recognize their own cognitive limitations.

In this sense, ignorance can become pedagogically productive. When students recognize what they do not know, they can formulate questions and engage in inquiry. The educational goal is therefore not to eliminate all ignorance-which is impossible-but to transform unrecognized ignorance into conscious inquiry.

Ethical Consequences of Ignorance

Ignorance also has direct ethical consequences. Decisions concerning health, education, environment, technology, interpersonal relations, and public life often depend on the quality of available knowledge. When individuals make consequential decisions based on unsupported assumptions, the effects can extend beyond themselves.

Nevertheless, ethical analysis must distinguish responsibility from blame. Individuals do not always have equal access to reliable knowledge, and they cannot reasonably be expected to know everything. Ethical responsibility should therefore take into account accessibility of evidence, available educational resources, social circumstances, and the significance of the decision.

The concept of epistemic responsibility provides a useful framework. Individuals have greater responsibility when reliable information is accessible, when the consequences of a decision are significant, and when there are reasonable opportunities to verify relevant claims. Conversely, responsibility may be reduced when information is genuinely unavailable or when the issue involves substantial uncertainty.

This approach avoids an overly simplistic moralization of ignorance. It recognizes both individual agency and structural constraints.

Ignorance as a Condition of Philosophical Inquiry

An important paradox emerges from the analysis: ignorance can be both an obstacle to philosophy and the starting point of philosophy.

If ignorance means unquestioned certainty, it prevents inquiry. If ignorance means recognition of the limits of knowledge, it initiates inquiry. The difference lies in the individual's epistemic attitude.

Philosophical thinking begins when established assumptions become objects of questioning. Socratic dialogue, Cartesian doubt, Kantian critique, and contemporary epistemology all demonstrate different ways of examining the boundaries of knowledge [1,3,4]. Doubt is therefore not necessarily destructive. It can be methodological and productive.

This suggests a broader philosophical model in which knowledge and ignorance are dynamically related:

Ignorance → Question → Inquiry → Evidence → Provisional Knowledge → New Questions → Recognition of Further Ignorance

The model demonstrates that knowledge does not permanently eliminate ignorance. Each expansion of knowledge may reveal new areas of uncertainty. Scientific progress illustrates this principle particularly clearly: answering one question often produces several new questions.

Discussion: Toward a Philosophical Model of Ignorance

The results permit the development of a multidimensional model of ignorance consisting of four interconnected levels.

The first level is **epistemological ignorance**, concerning the limits and deficiencies of individual knowledge. The second is **ethical ignorance**, concerning responsibility

for acquiring and evaluating relevant knowledge. The third is **social ignorance**, concerning unequal access to knowledge and the social production of epistemic exclusion. The fourth is **digital ignorance**, concerning the effects of algorithmic mediation, misinformation, information overload, and fragmented communication.

These levels should not be treated as independent. They interact continuously. For example, algorithmic information environments can influence individual beliefs; unequal digital literacy can increase vulnerability to misinformation; and institutional structures can determine which forms of knowledge receive public visibility.

The proposed model can therefore be represented as follows:

Individual cognition → Social environment → Information structures → Epistemic judgment → Ethical action

At each stage, ignorance can either be reproduced or challenged.

The central implication is that overcoming ignorance requires more than increasing the quantity of information. It requires the development of epistemic practices. These include source evaluation, evidence-based reasoning, recognition of uncertainty, willingness to revise beliefs, intellectual humility, and awareness of the social conditions under which knowledge is produced.

The analysis also demonstrates that ignorance should not automatically be interpreted negatively. Certain forms of ignorance are unavoidable and may even be intellectually productive. The important distinction is between **recognized ignorance**, which stimulates inquiry, and **unrecognized or deliberately maintained ignorance**, which can obstruct rational judgment and social understanding.

Therefore, the philosophical problem of ignorance is ultimately a problem of human orientation toward knowledge. The key question is not whether individuals can eliminate ignorance but whether they can develop responsible relationships with what they know, what they do not know, and what they have reasons to investigate.

Conclusion

The study demonstrates that ignorance represents a multidimensional philosophical phenomenon extending beyond the absence of information. It encompasses epistemological limitations, ethical responsibilities, social structures, and digital transformations. Classical philosophical approaches show that recognizing one's own ignorance can serve as a starting point for inquiry, while contemporary epistemology demonstrates that ignorance may also be socially produced or actively maintained.

The digital environment has transformed the problem by creating conditions in which information abundance can coexist with epistemic uncertainty. Misinformation, algorithmic personalization, selective exposure, and information overload demonstrate that access to information does not automatically produce reliable knowledge.

Consequently, overcoming problematic forms of ignorance requires a combination of knowledge, critical thinking, intellectual humility, epistemic responsibility, and media literacy. The goal should not be the elimination of ignorance, which is impossible, but the development of an intellectually responsible relationship with uncertainty and the limits of human knowledge.

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Надандықтың философиялық өлшемдері: эпистемологиялық, этикалық және әлеуметтік аспектілері

Аңдатпа. Бұл мақалада надандық философиялық ұғым ретінде қарастырылып, оның таным, мораль, еркіндік және қоғамдық сана қалыптасуындағы орны талданады. Зерттеудің негізгі мақсаты – надандықты білімнің қарапайым жетіспеушілігі ретінде ғана емес, адамның шындықты қабылдауына, пайымдауына және әлеуметтік әрекетіне ықпал ететін күрделі эпистемологиялық әрі әлеуметтік феномен ретінде түсіндіру. Философия тарихындағы Сократтың «өзінің білмейтінін білу» қағидасы, Платонның үңгір аллегориясы, Ағартушылық дәуірінің рационалистік идеялары және қазіргі эпистемологиядағы интеллектуалдық жауапкершілік мәселелері теориялық негіз ретінде

қарастырылады. Сонымен қатар надандықтың пассивті және белсенді формалары, яғни ақпараттың болмауы мен ақиқатты саналы түрде елемеу арасындағы айырмашылық айқындалады. Цифрлық коммуникация жағдайында жалған ақпарат, ақпараттық шамадан тыс жүктеме және алгоритмдік ақпараттық көпіршіктер надандықтың жаңа формаларын қалыптастыратыны көрсетіледі. Зерттеу нәтижесінде сыни ойлау, интеллектуалдық кішіпейілділік және танымдық жауапкершілік надандықты еңсерудің маңызды шарттары ретінде ұсынылады.

Түйін сөздер: надандық, философия, эпистемология, білім, ақиқат, сыни ойлау, интеллектуалдық жауапкершілік, цифрлық қоғам.

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Философские измерения невежества: эпистемологические, этические и социальные аспекты

Аннотация. В статье невежество рассматривается как самостоятельный философский феномен, связанный не только с отсутствием знаний, но и с особенностями человеческого познания, морального выбора и общественного сознания. Цель исследования заключается в выявлении эпистемологических, этических и социальных измерений невежества и определении его роли в процессе формирования отношения человека к истине. В качестве теоретической основы анализируются философские идеи Сократа о признании собственного незнания, платоновская аллегория пещеры, рационалистическая традиция Просвещения и современные концепции эпистемической ответственности. Особое внимание уделяется различию между пассивным незнанием, возникающим вследствие отсутствия информации, и активным невежеством, предполагающим сознательное игнорирование доступного знания. В условиях цифрового общества проблема приобретает дополнительную актуальность вследствие распространения дезинформации, информационных пузырей, алгоритмической селекции контента и снижения качества публичной коммуникации. Делается вывод о том, что преодоление невежества требует не только расширения объёма знаний, но и развития критического мышления, интеллектуальной скромности и ответственности субъекта познания.

Ключевые слова: невежество, философия, эпистемология, знание, истина, критическое мышление, эпистемическая ответственность, цифровое общество.

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