

VALUES AND VALUE ORIENTATIONS*

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Abstract. The article focuses on the examination of value and value orientations phenomena. We elucidate the genesis of the concept of value and the establishment of axiology as a discipline concerned with values. The positions of such classics of the secular theory of values as G. Rickert, M. Scheler, and N. von Hartmann, as well as representatives of its religious version, presented by N. O. Lossky and D. von Hildebrand, are analyzed. The second part of the article examines some concepts of values of researchers of the last decades of the twentieth century and also pays attention to the phenomenon of value orientations. It is established that only from the positions of the activity approach and the principle of cultural historicism is it possible to adequately reveal the essence of values and value orientations. The article adopts the concept of values, according to which value is a super-useful semantic attitude of a person to reality. The second part of the article analyzes some interpretations of the essence of values of the last decades of the twentieth century. The author shares the concept of values based on the activity approach and the principle of historicism.

Keywords: value, utility, axiology, value orientations, axiosphere.

Introduction

Any scientific or philosophical concept or category that is familiar today sometimes has a very long history, so to speak, of latent existence. European science and philosophy have their main source in Greco-Roman culture, science, and philosophy. But science and philosophy themselves were formed in Ancient Greece, of course, not without the influence of ancient Indian spiritual and ideological traditions, but mainly from the understanding of Greek mythology and everyday city-state life. Future specialized concepts and categories are formed in the process of ordinary life and tested in conversations and debates.

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Almost all cities of Ancient Greece had public places, sometimes connected to the market and called agoras. In his time, in the Athenian agora, the famous Socrates unobtrusively and imperceptibly for the interlocutor tried to develop in him the correct understanding of this or that issue. One such “latent” concept in Antiquity and for many centuries after it was the concept of “value”. And only in the second half of the 19th century did it declare itself as a philosophical concept. Nevertheless, disputes about its content, conceptual status, scope, and limits of applicability continue to this day. The purpose of this article is to provide a brief overview and analysis of the main interpretations of the phenomenon of value and justify the choice of its explanation.

Research Methodology

The work uses some scientific and philosophical methods that have proven themselves well. The main ones were the activity approach and the principle of cultural historicism. They focused, firstly, on the fact that values are not some ontological phenomenon but a product of human activity and human relationships. The principle of cultural historicism made it possible to explain why the concept of value was articulated in the philosophy of the 18th century.

Value as a philosophical problem

As a concept, value has existed since ancient times. But this concept has not become the subject of conscious research. The beginning of its more or less explicit articulation in public and individual consciousness falls on the New Age, when capitalism began to form in Western Europe, based on individualism and a system of relations of material dependence. Already in the Age of Enlightenment, the word “value” appears in scholarly treatises. As a certain concept, it is used by I. Kant in his ethical teaching. Thus, in the “Fundamentals of the Metaphysics of Morals” (1875), he asserted, “...That which constitutes the condition under which alone it is possible for something to be an end in itself has not only a relative value, i.e., a price, but also an internal value, i.e., dignity.” [1, p. 277].

But value acquired a truly conceptual status in the works of the German philosopher, psychologist, and natural scientist R. G. Lotze (1817–1881). In 1856–1864, he published a book in three parts, “Microcosm. Thoughts on the Natural and Social History of Mankind. An Anthropological Essay,” in which he first elevated value to the level of an independent general philosophical category, separating it from the world of phenomena. According to him, in contrast to truths and facts, value definitions (Wertbestimmungen) belong to the world of what should be. At the same time, the concept of significance, which, along with what should be, is one of the most important features of value consciousness, also receives the status of an independent category (see about this in [2, p. 1, p. 123]). This is the beginning of the doctrine of values.

In 1902, two proposals appeared to designate this teaching. The French philosopher P. Lapie, in his work “The Logic of Will” proposed the term “axiology” (from the Greek words ἀξία (value) + λόγος (teaching)), and I. Kreibig proposed the term “thymology” (from the Greek words τιμή (assessment, price) + λόγος (teaching)). The term

proposed by P. Lapie won. Somewhat later, the German philosopher E. von Hartmann, in his work “The System of Philosophy in General Outline” (1907-1909), defines the place of axiology along with epistemology, natural philosophy, metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of religion, thereby confirming the name and status of the new philosophical discipline. From that time on, the long history of this discipline began, continuing to the present day.

And yet, the problem of values came into full play in the works of representatives of neo-Kantianism. In the Baden School, these were W. Windelband and G. Rickert, and in the Marburg School, G. Cohen. We will turn to G. Rickert. The latter specifically touched on the problem of values in his works “On the Concept of Philosophy” (1910) and “On the System of Values” (1914). The second paragraph of the article “On the Concept of Philosophy” is called “Value and Reality”. The logic of G. Rickert’s reasoning is as follows. The subject of philosophy is the world as a whole, or the world as a whole. It seeks to develop what is called a worldview. Reflection on the world leads to the opposition of the self and the world, or in other words, the subject and the object. Rickert notes that the “world problem” consists in the relationship between the self and the world, the subject and the object. This problem allows for two solutions. The first is to understand the world as a whole by starting from the object by including the subject in it. The second solution is, on the contrary, to build a whole world from the subject. Thus, Rickert notes, two opposing worldviews arise, each of which is one-sided and, therefore, untrue. One is objectivist, the other subjectivist. Neither solves the problem of worldview. “The concept of the world they propose,” notes G. Rickert, “is too narrow for this. They both do not go beyond the framework of actual being, but no matter how broadly we think of being, it is still only a part of the world. In addition to being, there are also values, the significance of which we want to understand. Only the totality of being and values together constitutes what deserves the name of world” [3, p. 22].

This is the main position of G. Rickert and the neo-Kantians of the Baden school in general: the world, which includes the subject and the object, is not the whole world, but only a part of it. Ordinary people, Rickert notes, reason as follows. Values can be found in some objects. They are also usually called values. But this is a complete mistake. For example, a painting or a sculpture is called a value. But are the canvas, paints, and varnish of a painting or the marble (bronze, wood, granite, and so on) of a statue values? It makes sense, Rickert notes, to call such objects “goods”, distinguishing them from the values that are contained in these objects. However, value is undoubtedly somehow connected not only with the object but also with the subject: after all, it is he who evaluates the objects. The question arises: can the act of evaluation and value be one and the same? This is usually thought so, Rickert notes. Therefore, they believe that without an evaluating subject, there is no value. They confuse values and evaluations, and this happens all the time.

In our opinion, G. Rickert is absolutely right in distinguishing between the concepts of value and evaluation. If an evaluation may or may not exist, then the existence of value always takes place. Value is logically primary to the act of evaluation and therefore to the evaluation itself. But Rickert goes further. He writes, “For value as value, the question of its existence is devoid of any meaning. The problem of value is the problem of the “significance” (Geltung) of value, and this question in no way coincides with the question of the existence of the act of evaluation. [3, p. 23]. In

everyday life, goods and evaluations are considered values. In fact, Rickert believes these are not values at all, but a unity of values and certain objects. But values do not belong to either the world of objects or the world of subjects but form a completely independent kingdom beyond them (see [3, p. 23]). The question arises: what is this sphere, what is this dimension, in which values are concentrated? G. Rickert connects this “middle kingdom” with the concept of meaning. Thus, the world, according to him, consists of reality, divided into object and subject, values and meaning. From all that has been considered, we see that Rickert, firstly, did not explain what value is, what its essence is; secondly, he did not reveal the mode of existence of values and the place of their concentration; thirdly, to this “x” he also added “y” – meaning, about which, as well as about values, he said nothing intelligible.

The famous founder of philosophical anthropology, M. Scheler, discussed the problem of values in his work “Formalism in Ethics and the Material Ethos of Values” (1916). Being a follower of E. Husserl, he tried to apply the phenomenological approach to the study of values, i.e., to construct a phenomenological axiology. M. Scheler’s position, in principle, differs little from that of G. Rickert, but, of course, does not coincide with it in many details. Let us note some. Scheler divides values into positive and negative. Moreover, this difference, he believes, “is determined by the essence of values and is significant completely independently of the fact that we can feel certain special value opposites...” [4, p. 300], i.e., it is determined objectively-ontologically.

M. Scheler distinguishes between values and the bearers of values in which values are manifested. These can be various objects, goods, etc., among which individuals occupy a special place. Scheler provides a classification of values, which, according to him, is built into a strict hierarchy: there are higher and lower values. “The fact that a certain value is “higher” than another,” writes Scheler, “is comprehended in a special act of cognition of values, which is called “preference”. [4, p. 305]. The act opposite to preference, according to Scheler, is disdain. The hierarchy of values, he notes, cannot be logically deduced. A person must each time anew determine the status of a particular value in acts of preference and disdain. Despite the fact that some aspects of Scheler’s theory of value are positive, in general this theory cannot be considered entirely positive. It does not answer the question of the essence of values, the “place” of their concentration, and so on.

The theory of values was also developed by the German philosopher N. von Hartmann, the founder of the so-called “critical ontology”. On the basis of this ontology, he developed problems of the theory of knowledge, ethics, aesthetics, and philosophy of history. His theory of values is also based on it. According to him, the world has a hierarchical structure; it consists of four “layers”: inorganic nature, life, and mental and spiritual being.

According to N. Hartmann, values, along with the logical sphere, belong to the sphere of ideal being. The sphere of values is related to the sphere of essences but is not identical to it. Essences, he notes, “behave like laws to which real cases are entirely subordinated. In the case of values, this is not so. Real cases may correspond to them or may not correspond; and then in the first case they turn out to be “valuable,” and in the second, “counter-valuable”. Values do not directly determine the real but form only an instance of its value or counter-value. But in their own existence, the counter-value of the real does not change anything. They thus, from the very beginning, turn out to

be independent of whether reality corresponds to them or not. In this respect, their independence is clearly higher than the independence of essences" [5, pp. 598–599].

"Values," asserts N. Hartmann, "do not possess a real being in themselves" [6, p. 200]. Their being in themselves is entirely ideal. They are absolute and unchangeable. Only a person's value consciousness can change. Like M. Scheler, N. Hartmann touches upon the problem of the hierarchy of values. In his book "Aesthetics," he identified six hierarchically arranged classes of values (see [7, p. 477]). This is, in general terms, N. von Hartmann's theory of values. In it, he gives answers to many questions, but he does not answer the most important one: what is value, what is its essence?

The problem of values in religious philosophy

So far we have considered secular concepts of value. But there have also been and are religious ones. The Catholic philosopher and phenomenologist D. von Hildebrand presented his theory in his work "Ethics". He bases it on the concept of significance. He identifies two types. For example, a compliment given by one person to another is significant only subjectively. And, for example, an act of forgiveness by one person to another is significant in itself. The first type of significance brings satisfaction; the second contains value. Hildebrand notes that "value has significance independently of its influence on us" [8, p. 45]. Thus, value is significant in itself. At the same time, the difference between value and that which merely brings pleasure is, according to Hildebrand, not a difference in degree but in essence, a fundamental difference. Along with pleasure and value, he also singles out objective good. According to Hildebrand, there is an essential difference between objective good and purely subjective pleasure and between value and subjective pleasure. Objective good, he notes, presupposes value but at the same time is different from it. The question of the origin of values is quite logical. But D. von Hildebrand declares that this question is inappropriate. As a way out of the situation, he uses the concept of God, asserting that the concept of value "already contains God in our concept ..." [8, p. 131], and "the relationship between any value embodied in a created object and God has the character of reflection. Any value of a created object reflects God in a special way, the essence of all values" [8, p. 204]. Thus, God is the source of values; having created the world, he also put values into it. This answer, it seems, is the easiest, since it cannot be verified.

The theory of values developed by the Russian religious philosopher N. O. Lossky is also connected with the concept of God. This connection is already visible in the title of the work in which this theory is presented: "Value and Being. God and the Kingdom of God as the Basis of Values" (1931). "Value," Lossky writes in the introduction to this work, "is something all-pervasive, determining the meaning of the whole world as a whole, and of each individual, and of each event, and of each action. Every slightest change introduced into the world by any actor has a value side and is undertaken only on the basis of some value moments and for their sake" [9, p. 250]. However, this omnipresence of values, Lossky notes, does not facilitate but, on the contrary, complicates their study.

He calls his philosophy ideal-realism. Consequently, a true theory of values can only be ideal-realistic. He distinguishes two main types of value – primary and derivative. He writes, "The concept of derivative value can be easily defined: it is

being in its meaning for the realization of the absolute fullness of being or the removal from it. The whole difficulty lies in defining the primary supra-mundane absolute positive value: it is God as the Good itself, the absolute fullness of being, which in itself has a meaning that justifies it, makes it an object of approval, and gives it an unconditional right to realization and preference over anything else" [9, p. 286]. The definition of derivative value, Lossky notes, does not contain a division into genus and specific difference.

According to him, experience is part of value, but it is not the main thing in it. The main thing in it is meaning and sense. They constitute the ideal aspect of value. Consequently, Lossky asserts, every value is either completely ideal or simply contains the ideal aspect. But, according to him, only God, the primary value, is a completely ideal value, and all derivative values are ideally real. Lossky considers the distinction between goods and values, significant for Western axiologists – his predecessors and contemporaries – to be insignificant. Lossky also divides values into absolute and relative, objective and subjective, and positive and negative.

The question arises: does the teaching of N. O. Lossky overcome those one-sidednesses of Western versions of axiology, which he himself pointed out, and, most importantly, does it answer the question, what is value? What is its nature? In our opinion, no. Let us say that his overcoming of the opposition of goods and values can be considered a positive moment. Equally positive can be considered the fact that he "poured" values into the world of being and brought them out, so to speak, from that incomprehensible area where they were placed by G. Rickert or N. Hartmann. But he passed by D. von Hildebrand's distinction between purely subjective pleasures and values. His division of values into subjective and objective is purely quantitative in nature, and the division into positive and negative is based on the concepts of good and evil. And although Lossky stipulates that he takes these concepts not in a narrow ethical but in a broad sense, this "broad" sense for him cannot be other than religious. It is precisely the religious nature of Lossky's axiology that makes it, in our opinion, limited.

The Essence of value in contemporary philosophy

This is our view of the first steps of axiology and our assessment of its classical representatives of this period. Time passed, and new and "long-forgotten old" appeared, presented as new teachings on values and interpretations of the essence of values. In the first half of the 60s of the last century, a discussion took place in the former Soviet philosophy about whether a special teaching on values was appropriate in state, i.e., "Marxist-Leninist" philosophy. The most diverse points of view were presented, but the discussion was curtailed after the introduction of Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia. Later, values began to be written about in sociological and psychological studies.

But in philosophy, both Western and in the philosophy of the independent states that emerged from the ruins of the Soviet Union, the problem of values continues to be relevant. And there are still various interpretations of the essence of values. There are even some curious ones, so it is not clear whether their authors are fully aware of their definitions. For example, L. V. Baeva writes, "Value is a complex existential

phenomenon that includes anthropological and ontological sources, where the first is associated with the existence of the individual as a condition for the preference, evaluation, and creation of values, and the second is conditioned by the situationality of being, which does not a priori set the meaning and purpose of life but constitutes its needs and limits" [10, p. 9].

It seems to us that the solution to the problem of the essence of values is solved within the framework of the alternative "to have or to be" formulated by E. Fromm. And attempts to solve this problem precisely within the framework of this alternative can be found in the literature. Thus, according to P. Mentzer, value is what "people's feelings dictate to be recognized as standing above everything and to which one can strive, contemplate, treat with respect, recognition, reverence" (cited from [11, p. 498]). And the French philosopher A. Comte-Sponville writes that value is "that which is valued. Can we say that value is that which has a price? - He asks and answers, "Only in relation to what is sold. <...> One should distinguish between things that have value (which finds more or less precise expression within the framework of the logic of exchange) and things that are values. The latter have no price and cannot be the subject of equivalent exchange for money or even for other values." [12, p. 673]. Here he distinguishes between value (a general cultural phenomenon) and cost – a purely economic phenomenon. And his conclusion is this: "Values have no price; they... possess a dignity that has no equivalent and are incapable of serving as an object of exchange" [12, p. 674].

It is the ideas of P. Mentzer and A. Comte-Sponville that G. S. Batishchev's position is close to, although he was most likely not familiar with them. He identifies three essentially inherent levels in human existence and its relation to reality (he calls them fields in the sense of this term when talking, for example, about a magnetic field). These fields are related to each other according to the logic of hierarchy. G. S. Batishchev calls the lower "field" the field of utilities. Utility corresponds to a certain need. A person-subject within the boundaries of this level field is the starting point: it is he who demands the useful from reality. A. A. Khamidov, who shares Batishchev's position, calls this level need-utility. Above it, according to Batishchev, is the "field of aspirations. Here, man is no longer the starting point of the relationship: with his whole being, he is directed toward certain semantic points, which are values. G. S. Batishchev writes, "In the field of infinite aspirations, the subject acts as such a subject for whom even the most enormous amount of utility has no power of influence on him in comparison with the value and target... quality of direction" [13, p. 433]. A. A. Khamidov calls this level aspiration value.

Thus, the phenomenon of value is distinguished as a concrete, specific phenomenon of human reality, which cannot be identified with any other phenomenon significant for a person. "Value as such," notes Khamidov, "represents a supra-utility semantic content in the composition of culture, not reducible to utility in any of its moments and not deducible from it" [14, p. 329]. In their system, values form an entire axiosphere (from ἀξία – value and σφαῖρα – sphere), which, of course, does not form a sphere in accordance with the geometric meaning of the concept of "sphere" but is dispersed across all levels of culture as a whole (see [14, p. 325]).

But each born individual finds in society a certain ready-made system of values (axiosphere) not created by him. But this sphere and the values that make it up somehow

arise at some point. That is why G. S. Batishchev also writes about the third-level field. This is the field of creation of the infinite aspirations themselves, or creativity itself as a cosmic, universal, existential co-authorship" [13, p. 433]. The overwhelming majority of people, as a rule, do not participate in their formation. But the process of renewal of values and creation of new values in human reality takes place.

Every individual and every human community has an inherent tendency towards a certain set of values. Such aspiration is called value orientation. Value orientations are an important factor that determines the motives for a person's actions and deeds. These orientations are formed in an individual from childhood. Initially, they are learned gradually, bypassing his conscious instance and imperceptibly becoming his property. The formation of value orientations is influenced first by the family and kindergarten (if the child attends it), then by school. In adolescence, the street (in the broad sense) has its influence, then various youth organizations, work collectives, etc. Developed value orientations are a sign of a person's maturity as an individual, an indicator of the degree of his sociality, loyalty to certain principles and ideals, and ability to make volitional efforts in the name of these ideals and values. Value orientations ensure the integrity and stability of the personality, determine the structures of consciousness and programs and strategies of activity, and control and organize the motivational structure and orientations towards specific types of activity and communication.

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In the leading capitalist countries, since the second half of the 20th century, consumer sentiments and orientations have begun to be acquired not so much on values as on needs. Even theories of a "high consumer society" have appeared. The principle of individualism has merged with the principle of consumerism. When the Soviet Union collapsed, ideas of individualism and consumerism began to penetrate into the sovereign states that emerged from its ruins. Value orientations seemed to recede into the background. All this had an impact primarily on young people. Researchers note that many representatives of post-Soviet youth have become most concerned with the problems of the quality and level of education and the family crisis, but at the same time, cultural problems remain in second place. Young people are not concerned with global problems today. Values in their understanding are obtaining a profession and a decent job, a career, and receiving pleasure, regardless of their quality. There is a slight decrease in the social activity of young people, a loss of their basic spiritual values, and their consciousness has all the signs of confusion and incompleteness. Therefore, the main task of the socio-cultural sphere today is to form correct value orientations in the younger generation.

Conclusion

The article sets and solves the problem of clarifying the essence and cultural status of values and value orientations. It is shown that only an activity-based, cultural-historical approach allows us to solve it adequately. Due to the limited scope of the article, many problems remain outside the scope of the article, which are set and solved in both foreign and domestic axiology by applying a methodology that is insufficient

for their solution. Such problems as the coexistence of different values, the conflict of values, finding out what the so-called “universal values” actually are, and some others remain outside the scope of the article. The author of the article leaves all this for his further research work.

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Аматаякул С., Құлсариеva А., Саги Е. Құндылықтар мен құндылықтық бағдарлар

Аннотация. Мақала құндылық және құндылықтық бағдарлар құбылыстарын талдауға арналған. Құндылық түсінігінің пайда болуы және аксиологияның құндылықтар туралы ғылым ретінде қалыптасуы көрсетілген. Г. Риккерт, М. Шелер, Н.фон Хартман сияқты зайдырылған діни нұсқасының өкілдерінің ұстанымдары талданады. Мақаланың екінші бөлімінде XX ғасырдың соңғы онжылдықтарындағы зерттеушілердің құндылықтарының кейбір концепциялары қарастырылады, сонымен қатар құндылықтық бағдарлар құбылысына назар аударылады. Құндылықтар мен құндылықтық бағдарлардың мәнін тек қана іс-әрекеттік тұрғысынан және мәдени-тариҳи ұстаным тұрғысынан жеткілікті түрде ашуға болатыны анықталды. Мақалада құндылық бұл адамның шындыққа деген пайдалылықтан жоғары семантикалық катынасы деп қарастырылатын құндылықтар концепциясы қабылданған. Мақаланың екінші бөлігінде XX ғасырдың соңғы онжылдығындағы құндылықтардың мәніне қатысты кейбір түсіндірмелер талданады. Авторлар іс-әрекеттілік әдісі мен тарихилық принципіне негізделген құндылықтар тұжырымдамасымен бөліседі.

Түйін сөздер: құндылық, пайдалылық, аксиология, құндылықтық бағдарлар, аксиосфера.

Аматаякул С., Кулсариеva А., Саги Е. Ценности и ценностные ориентации

Аннотация. Статья посвящена анализу феноменов ценности и ценностных ориентаций. Показано зарождение понятия ценности и формирование аксиологии как науки о ценностях. Проанализированы позиции таких классиков светской теории ценностей, как Г. Риккерт, М. Шелер, Н. фон Гартман, а также представителей религиозного её варианта, представленного Н. О. Лосским и Д. фон Гильдебрандом. Во второй части статьи рассмотрены некоторые концепции ценностей исследователей последних десятилетий XX в., а также удалено внимание феномену ценностных ориентаций. Установлено, что только с позиций деятельностного подхода и принципа

культуроисторизма возможно адекватное раскрытие сущности ценностей и ценностных ориентаций. В статье принятая концепция ценностей, согласно которой ценность есть надполезностное смысловое отношение человека к действительности. Во второй части статьи анализируются некоторые трактовки сущности ценностей последних десятилетий XX в. Авторы разделяют концепцию ценностей, базирующуюся на деятельностном подходе и принципе историзма.

Ключевые слова: ценность, полезность, аксиология, ценностные ориентации, аксиосфера.

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