

## VIRTUAL REALITY AND THE LIMITS OF INTERPRETATION: A PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH<sup>\*</sup>

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**Abstract.** The research is devoted to the philosophical analysis of virtual reality as a phenomenon at the intersection of ontology, philosophy of consciousness and philosophy of language. The relevance of the work is conditioned by the increasing role of virtual reality in social and cognitive spheres, as well as the need to critically analyse its influence on the perception of reality. The aim of the study is to identify the conceptual foundations of virtuality using philosophical, linguistic and semiotic approaches. The methodology is based on interdisciplinary analysis, including philosophical concepts of reality, linguistic theory of mental spaces, and social epistemology approaches. The main results consist in the formation of the concept of virtual reality as a dynamic ontological structure interacting with consciousness and language. The study shows that virtuality is not an exclusively technological phenomenon, but is a philosophical category that touches upon fundamental issues of perception and interpretation of reality. The specificity of the work lies in the integration of philosophical, linguistic and semiotic analyses of virtuality, which allows us to propose a new approach to its interpretation within the framework of modern philosophical discourse.

**Keywords:** ontology of virtuality, philosophy of consciousness, semiotics, mental spaces, cognitive linguistics, social epistemology

### *Introduction*

Issues related to virtual reality are becoming increasingly relevant in contemporary culture and philosophical discourse. One of the key aspects in the study of the

\* This research has been funded by the Committee of Science of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan (IRN No. BR21882302 Kazakhstan's society in the context of digital transformation: prospects and risks)

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phenomenon of virtuality is the interaction between philosophical concepts and the expanding field of research on virtual reality as a technological construct. While this research domain is inherently interdisciplinary, it is philosophical methodology that offers unique heuristic potential for its analysis.

Philosophical reflection on virtuality goes beyond its interpretation as merely a technologically constructed environment. It not only promotes an interdisciplinary perspective but also provides various philosophical interpretations of the phenomenon. The origins of such reflections can be traced back to ancient philosophy, where the foundations for a critical analysis of reality and its perception were laid. In the classical tradition, reality was understood as a phenomenon grounded either in sensory experience or in rational thought free from contradiction. These approaches, along with the corresponding epistemological models, may serve as useful frameworks for conceptualizing virtuality.

In contemporary philosophy, virtuality is most often analysed in the context of ontology, the philosophy of consciousness, and the philosophy of language. One of the most pressing directions of inquiry involves investigating virtuality in terms of the criteria for actual and possible being. It is important to note that the concept of the «virtual,» despite its evident connection to the digital sphere, has a much older history, bound up with its relation to the real and the factual. The ontological analysis of modern digital virtual worlds merely intensifies the question of the mode of existence of virtual objects, events, and actions – and whether these aspects of virtuality can be regarded as part of the real world. In response to these questions, one may formulate a set of uncertainties characteristic of virtual environments: ontological, semantic, existential, and institutional [1, p. 4]. This conceptual framework shows that while certain aspects of virtuality exist solely within virtual domains, others occupy an indeterminate position between the virtual and the real, moving from imitation and simulation of reality to becoming real in themselves.

Following G. Deleuze's notion of the virtual as the potential, Brian Massumi poses a critical question: how can one perceive a potential that never manifests as such, precisely because of its essentially abstract nature [2]? To address this, the author identifies three types of virtuality – forms, events, and values – which leads to the hypothesis that any theory of the virtual must inherently be ethical, insofar as it deals with actions that give rise to dynamic differences in human and social life. These, in turn, may be viewed as part of reality defined through the concepts of presence [1], multiplicity [3], and situatedness [4]. Accordingly, the present study undertakes a historical-philosophical analysis of virtual reality as a distinctive mode of the existence of space and time, in which ontological and epistemological problems acquire new dimensions.

### ***Methodology***

The study of virtual reality is conducted from an interdisciplinary perspective, incorporating philosophical, linguistic, and semiotic approaches. The methodological foundation of this research is based on hermeneutic text analysis, philosophical reconstruction of virtuality concepts, comparative analysis of ontological models, and cognitive-linguistic methods. The study places significant emphasis on the concept of mental spaces, developed by G. Fauconnier, which allows virtuality to be understood

as a specific way of organizing knowledge and experience. The application of semiotic analysis helps reveal the structural characteristics of virtual discourse and its influence on reality interpretation. Additionally, a historical-philosophical approach is employed to trace the evolution of perspectives on virtuality from ancient philosophy to modern concepts of digital reality.

### ***Virtuality and Reality: Seeking Boundaries and Criteria***

The ontological formulation of the problem of virtuality primarily entails the search for criteria that distinguish the real from the unreal – that which is illusory, imagined, or merely possible. The fundamental issue lies in specifying the standards by which virtual objects might be qualified as real.

In this search for the characteristics of reality, we may turn to the constructivist approach, which aims to identify the main modalities of the social construction of virtuality. It is widely assumed that objects within virtual environments are not real, but merely imitations or simulations of real objects. For instance, a virtual apple may resemble a real one in appearance, but it cannot be classified as such. A real apple possesses weight, mass, physical location in space, and physical and chemical properties that allow it to interact with objects in the physical world. These features are precisely what allow us to affirm its actual existence rather than regard it as a merely imagined or represented object. In contrast, a virtual apple lacks such properties. It appears instead as a fictional construct – a visual projection that responds to computer input [5, p. 44-45]. This reflection raises an important question: if virtual objects are not real physical entities but nevertheless «possess» existence, what is their ontological status?

The reality of the existence of objects in virtual environments, especially with the emergence of modern digital technologies, has acquired the form of a dichotomy. Objects may exist not only in the subject's consciousness but also as elements of digital systems, and yet they resemble neither tangible material entities nor mental images or ideas in any conventional sense of reality. Thus arises a paradox: the virtual object exists, but it is not real in the classical ontological sense – a paradox that compels us to rethink the very criteria of being and reality.

*Regarding the reality of «possible worlds» in the history of philosophy*, a brief survey of key philosophical traditions may help clarify the status of virtual being. One of the earliest forms of virtuality may be found in mythological thinking, inseparable from magical modes of understanding and engaging with the world. Within the framework of pre-modern worldviews, the category of reality was not clearly delineated, as all forms of undifferentiated reality were considered valid – including the possible, the actual, the desired, and so forth. Reality could encompass even that which was presumed to result from the will of the subject. Various connections between phenomena were treated as equally valid, with no clear distinction between objective and subjective, actual and potential, material and ideal [3]. This lack of differentiation renders magical thinking a kind of proto-philosophical virtuality – a form of experience in which the distinction between the possible and the actual is reduced or even absent.

With the emergence of philosophical discourse, the search for substantial foundations of being begins, along with the effort to differentiate its levels. In the classical philosophical tradition, according to Laszlo Ropolyi, virtuality begins to function as a

designation of ontologically unstable phenomena – those which may appear real but, upon analytical scrutiny, lose that status [6]. Within this context, two basic paradigms of reality take shape. The materialist tradition, represented by Heraclitus and Aristotle, emphasizes the reliability of sensory experience as the foundation of truth. Meanwhile, the tradition stemming from Parmenides affirms the primacy of thought over empirical perception, suggesting that true being is accessible only through reason. These two strategies – empirical-sensory and intellectual-aprioristic – provide parallel foundations for conceptualizing both reality and its virtual forms.

In Plato, this dichotomy is further developed into the opposition between the sensory world as shadow and the world of ideas as true reality. The sensory world, in this interpretation, is a mere imitation – limited, changing, and transient – and thus, essentially virtual. The empirical world of things, for Plato, is ontologically unstable, whereas the realm of intelligible essences is complete and unchanging.

Aristotle, by contrast, offers a more dynamic scheme, wherein the distinction between actuality and potentiality defines the model for the transition between virtuality and reality. The potential is not opposed to the actual but is embedded within it as an inherent capacity of all that exists.

Thus, in mythological and early philosophical ontologies, reality was understood as a hierarchical multiplicity of forms of being, each with a different degree of ontological completeness. Within this discourse, virtuality appears as a partial, transitory, or non-finalized form of presence – one that may either be transformed into actuality or lose its ontological validity altogether. Pre-modern thought, in this way, permitted the existence of multiple possible worlds in which virtual elements constituted an open and dynamic vision of being.

*The «Virtual» Project of Modernity.* The contemporary formulation of the problem of virtuality is complicated by the fact that its technological embodiment introduces significant confusion into the very distinction between the real and the unreal. As Philip Brey notes, «when we ask whether virtual objects exist or whether they are (un) real, we become entangled in our language» [5, p. 44]. Virtual objects – for example, «apples» – merely simulate or imitate real apples. To say that they are not real is ambiguous: it may mean that they are not actual apples, or that they do not exist at all (not even as virtual apples). A virtual apple is, in fact, a real entity – but not a real apple. As Dilworth J. puts it, it is a specific model, much like a physical imitation of an apple [7].

At the same time, many objects in virtual worlds now evidently lack real physical existence (digital money, for example). On the one hand, one could argue that computers possess the capacity to ontologically reproduce entities that have traditionally existed in physical form, yet are not, by their nature, physical. The case of money demonstrates this well: historically, it was represented in the form of coins and banknotes. However, this form of existence is nothing more than a social convention. Increasingly, money exists in digital form. A so-called smart card contains code – a sequence of zeros and ones – that determines the amount of funds «stored» on it. In this way, money becomes a digital object. This indicates that money is not inherently a physical entity; it may exist in digital or virtual format.

It is important to underscore that even real money – banknotes, coins, etc. – comes into existence only as a social construct. Once people begin to intentionally represent,

use, accept, and believe in these entities as money, the fact emerges: these items or phenomena (paper, metal, a digital string of zeros and ones) become money.

On the other hand, when virtual objects are generated by computer systems, they differ from other metaphysical levels of being – or from the content of waking consciousness – in one essential respect: they appear to us in particular ways. In other words, virtual objects possess phenomenal qualities –colour, shape, sound – through which we interpret them as qualia.

Virtual objects, therefore, undeniably exist: they inhabit virtual environments accessed by millions of users globally and constitute the very entities with which we interact and to which we refer in discourse. This raises a fundamental question: how is it possible to assert that something exists and yet deny its reality? Although digital objects, unlike physical ones, do not possess mass or occupy a definite location in physical space, they nevertheless exhibit certain characteristics that allow us to classify them as a particular kind of object. Digital objects are qualified as objects because they are persistent, unified, stable structures with attributes and relations to other objects, and because agents are capable of interacting with them. This object-like behavior allows us to pragmatically define them as objects of a certain kind. Their unity and behavioral consistency are guaranteed by both hardware and software systems.

When offering a technological definition of a virtual object, it is possible to highlight its digital nature, its perception by users as akin to that of physical objects, and our interaction with it in a manner similar to how we engage with physical entities. Virtual objects are also artifacts – human-created constructs designed to perform specific functions within a virtual world or environment.

### ***Constructing Virtual Reality***

From the standpoint of philosophical methodology, the technological definition of virtuality appears not only limited, but also lacking in any explanatory capacity regarding how virtual reality is actually formed. Emphasizing the importance of a specifically philosophical approach to questions of virtual ontology, Thomas Metzinger argues that philosophy uniquely enables us to explore not only the phenomenon of conscious experience, but also its derivative manifestations – such as «the merging of user-controlled avatars and virtual agents, the virtual dissolution of the ego, management of the reality/virtuality continuum, and the emergence of a virtual *Lebenswelt*, which includes practical phenomenology and even religious belief» [4]. These examples may serve as a point of departure for deeper interdisciplinary engagement and the identification of new directions in research.

At the same time, it remains a justified claim that all entities generated by representational technologies are virtual by nature. The reason for this lies in the very mechanism of representation, since no representation is possible without the use of signs. The sign, in turn, possesses a dual ontological nature: it is an actual entity, while also serving as a potential reference to something else. We recognize something as a sign only when these two aspects are present simultaneously – for example, visually it may appear as a letter, while conceptually it corresponds to a particular meaning.

In other words, every act of representation presupposes the coexistence of two modes of being: the represented object and the representing entity. This may also be

interpreted as the existence of two distinct ontological contexts, within which the same entity assumes different significances. A necessary condition for representation is the relational correspondence between these two levels, which enables the processes of encoding, designation, and interpretation. In this sense, every representation embodies a relation of «actual–potential», thereby producing virtual entities. Within philosophical discourse, representations acquire ontological characteristics of relational structures that, in this context, constitute the foundation of virtual being [3].

In this regard, it is worth mentioning the concept developed by J. Searle (1995), who formulated an ontological theory that allows for a principled distinction between kinds of objects, actions, and events – those that belong to physical reality and those that are such only conditionally [8]. Later, Philip Brey applied this theory in his work «*The Social Ontology of Virtual Environments*» (2003) to analyse phenomena that can be ontologically reproduced in virtual form [9].

Thus, physical reality includes phenomena that are genuinely objective and exist independently of our representations of them. Social reality, by contrast, is often centered on phenomena, events, and facts that lack autonomous objectivity and instead result from processes of social construction and interpretation. Searle also emphasizes that the concepts we use to describe physical phenomena may themselves be socially constructed. However, he insists that even if social constructs were to disappear (e.g., with the extinction of humanity), this would not affect the existence of physical objects. This distinction marks a fundamental difference between physical (real) objects and social (virtual) constructs.

The crucial point, however, is that social facts are not only interpretative, but socially constructed in their very nature. The objectivity of these – essentially virtual – phenomena is grounded in a form of collective agreement, which reflects their dependence on human representation and intentionality [8]. The previously discussed example of digital money clearly illustrates this feature of social construction and its intrinsic connection to virtuality.

J. Searle argues that social facts arise as a result of the collective imposition of a function onto an object, event, or action. In this context, he distinguishes between two types of such constructed functions, each giving rise to a different kind of social fact. The first type consists of ordinary functions, collectively recognized and typically applied to (material) artifacts. The second type comprises status functions, which form the basis of institutional facts – the foundational elements of institutional reality.

A key distinction between ordinary social facts and institutional facts lies in the nature of their creation: while the establishment of ordinary social facts requires that an object be physically capable of performing a given function, the creation of institutional facts does not necessitate any inherent physical capacity in the object. Instead, the assignment of a status function involves a collective agreement to regard or treat a particular entity as if it possesses a causal power to perform the function in question. This agreement is expressed through a constitutive rule with the general form: «*X counts as Y in context C*» [5, p. 47].

An important example of an institutional phenomenon is language. Language exists as a collective convention whereby its symbols or combinations of symbols are understood to carry particular meanings. Non-linguistic symbols likewise derive their meaning through the collective imposition of a symbolic function upon them.

It is noteworthy that the distinction between physical reality, ordinary social reality, and institutional reality largely corresponds to the previously discussed distinction between simulation and ontological reproduction in virtual environments. While physical and ordinary social realities can typically only be simulated in such environments, institutional reality can, to a significant extent, be ontologically reproduced within them.

### ***Computational Technologies and the Linguistic Nature of Virtual Reality***

Interestingly, virtual reality may be conceptualized as an ontology realized through computational processes [10-12]. Its virtuality consists in the fact that symbolic structures exhibit a cohesive set of attributes that cannot be reduced to either tangible or imagined physical forms. Rather than directly embodying materiality, they functionally reproduce analogues of real-world objects. At a more conceptual level, virtual realities may be described as dynamic configurations defined by input/output operations and internal state relations, which are often associated with complex and differentiated causal functions. Through interfaces that mediate sensorimotor interaction, these structures are capable of initiating the emergence of phenomenal experiences within the user's consciousness.

Within the framework of semiotic theory, virtual reality is interpreted as a complex symbolic system generated by information technologies. This approach proves productive for analysing virtuality as a system of signs, wherein the sign – particularly in non-classical interpretations – may partially or fully substitute its referent. In this sense, virtual reality emerges as a reality-producing and reality-substituting structure, wherein some signs possess a schematic or conditional character (e.g., the symbol of a subject's presence in an online environment), while others approximate perceptual realism (e.g., in immersive game environments that simulate physical and psychological qualities of the user).

With the advancement of neural interfaces, it becomes possible to represent mental actions and to facilitate new forms of intersubjective communication that require minimal bodily mediation. Such models, as emphasized by Thomas Metzinger, may give rise to complex *social hallucinations* [4, p. 12]. This concept requires clarification: by «social hallucinations», Metzinger refers to subjective mental constructs that are collectively shared, yet lack ontological reality beyond consciousness and communication, while still being experienced as if they were real – especially in virtual, augmented, or mixed reality environments. Metzinger links this phenomenon to the idea of the *transparency of world-models*, in which a person does not perceive the representational nature of their experience. Virtual reality makes these models especially compelling: the user does not merely see the virtual object but experiences it as a part of the world. When many individuals share the same illusory model, a collectively shared hallucination arises.

In other words, as subjects interact within virtual spaces, they transfer familiar categories of perception, identity, and communication into those environments. As a result, stable mental constructs emerge – ones not grounded in physical reality, but functioning as social facts. To illustrate this definition, one may refer to instances of collectively perceived entities that lack ontological substance: digital selves, user pro-

files, avatars – all of which are perceived as real agents – or symbolic forms of social approval, such as virtual «friends» and «likes.» These are interpreted as real relationships, roles, statuses, and conflicts, though in fact they are ontologically non-existent – created within environments where the symbolic and perceptual levels merge. In this sense, they constitute mere *metadata* or *metainformation*.

However, a *social hallucination* is more than symbolic metadata – it is a deformed institutional fact, one that no longer recognizes its own symbolic nature.

This suggests the promising perspective of interpreting virtual reality as a linguistic model, which opens a new way of understanding the nature of language – as an original form of world-virtualization rooted in imagination and symbolization. This view of language goes back to Wilhelm von Humboldt, who emphasized that a human being exists not only within reality but also within the «circle of language», which serves not merely as a tool of description but as a mode of world-perception. As he noted, different languages do not simply denote the same thing in different ways; rather, they offer fundamentally different ways of grasping and conceptualizing reality [13].

Within the context of contemporary scientific paradigms, this idea finds expression in the concept of the linguistic worldview, which reflects the world-constructing function of language. One of the approaches most closely aligned with the understanding of language-created virtual spaces is that of Gilles Fauconnier, who developed the theory of mental spaces – cognitive constructs that represent real or hypothetical situations as they are formed in consciousness. G. Fauconnier interprets mental spaces as the result of linguistic activity, through which the parameters of modelled worlds and the relationships between them are established [14].

From this perspective, the so-called «real» world appears as merely one among many possible mental spaces, while language serves as the fundamental constructive mechanism that organizes and interconnects these spaces. Within this theoretical framework, mental spaces are described as cognitive structures organized through frames and stable knowledge schemas. They are dynamic, subject to change throughout discursive activity, and are presumed to correspond to neural patterns that reflect associative links between experiential elements.

In more recent studies, mental spaces are interpreted as a «third space» – a relatively autonomous cognitive reality that correlates with the virtual dimension. For instance, in their article «*Thirdspace: The Trialectics of the Real, Virtual and Blended Spaces*», M. Kosari and A. Amoori propose a model of trialectical relations among physical, virtual, and mental spaces [15]. This interaction calls for a rethinking of the ontology of embodiment, virtual perception, and the mechanisms by which the subject transitions between different modes of spatial experience.

## ***Conclusion***

Starting from the recognition that the existence of objects in virtual reality differs fundamentally from the ontological status of physical objects, it is possible to outline the key characteristics of their existence within virtual environments:

1. *Functional Activity.* A virtual object exists insofar as it performs functions within a particular digital system: it interacts with the user, influences the progression of events within a simulated environment, or participates in algorithmic processes.

2. *Ontological Dependence on Code.* A virtual object is not autonomous; its existence is defined by the underlying program code, hardware infrastructure, and access interfaces. Without its supporting system, it becomes not merely inaccessible but ontologically non-existent.

3. *Interactivity and Perceptual Availability.* An object exists to the extent that it can be perceived, called upon, activated, or modified by a user within the virtual environment. This feature brings it close to a phenomenological model of existence, where being is aligned with givenness to consciousness.

4. *Symbolic and Indexical Representation.* A virtual object may possess a visual, textual, or auditory form, but its «essence» does not coincide with its appearance. This reflects its dual nature: it exists both as a data structure and as a perceptual image.

5. *Potentiality of Being.* Unlike a physical object, a virtual object can be «switched off», inactive, or remain in a latent state. Its existence assumes a modal character – as a possibility actualized under specific conditions.

6. *Absence of Local Materiality.* A virtual object does not possess spatial extension or physical embodiment in the classical sense. Its «location» is a position within digital space, not identical to any physical placement.

The analysis conducted affirms that virtual reality is not merely a technological phenomenon, but a philosophically rich category reflecting fundamental transformations in our understanding of being, consciousness, and language. In contemporary digital and cognitive contexts, virtuality appears as a distinct mode of ontological organization where modes of representation, semiosis, intersubjectivity, and institutional construction intersect.

Within the ontological discourse, it has been demonstrated that virtual objects – despite lacking physical materiality – can be viewed as a special class of entities: ontologically dependent on code, functionally active, and phenomenologically accessible. Their being is determined not only by their presence in digital space, but also by their participation in symbolic and institutional relations, which allows us to consider them as derivative but stable ontological forms. Accordingly, the assertion that virtual objects are «unreal» loses its force in the context of contemporary philosophical and technological thought.

The application of semiotic and cognitive-linguistic approaches has revealed virtuality as a system of signs, where representations possess a dual status: they exist as actual elements of a digital environment while simultaneously pointing toward potential meanings and values. The concept of mental spaces developed by G. Fauconnier confirms that language is capable of constructing complex cognitive models, including those without direct ontological correlation in physical reality. In this sense, language and virtuality converge as parallel mechanisms of world-modelling.

Special attention in this study has been given to the institutional nature of virtual entities. Based on J. Searle's ontology of social facts, it has been shown that a significant portion of virtual reality may be understood as a domain of institutionally assigned statuses made possible by collective intentionality. This, in turn, allows for the ontological reproduction of a range of social phenomena in digital environments – such as digital currencies, virtual identities, digital property rights, and more.

Ultimately, it has been proposed to consider virtuality not merely as a result of technical simulation, but as a form of philosophical ontology of relations. Reinterpret-

ing virtuality as a category situated at the intersection of the possible and the actual, the individual and the institutional, enables the construction of a productive framework for further philosophical inquiry aimed at analysing the dynamics of digital reality, processes of meaning-making, and the transformation of notions of subjectivity, time, and space in a virtualized world.

Thus, virtual reality emerges as a phenomenon of complex and multi-layered nature – from the phenomenologically experienced to the institutionally reproduced, from the cognitively representational to the ontologically significant. This demands continued philosophical articulation, interdisciplinary analysis, and the development of new categorical languages capable of adequately expressing the specificity of being in the age of virtuality.

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**Виртуалды шындық және интерпретация шектері: философиялық тұғыр**

**Аннотация.** Зерттеу виртуалды шындықты онтология, сана философиясы және тіл философиясы тоғысындағы феномен ретінде философиялық тұрғыда талдауга бағытталған. Еңбектің өзектілігі виртуалды шындықтың әлеуметтік және когнитивті салаларындағы рөлінің артуы, сондай-ақ оның шындықты қабылдауға әсерін сынни тұрғыдан түсіну қажеттілігімен де анықталады. Зерттеудің мақсаты – философиялық, лингвистикалық және семиотикалық тұғырлар арқылы виртуалдықтың концептуалды негіздерін анықтау. Әдіснама реалдықтың философиялық тұжырымдамаларын, менталды кеңістіктің лингвистикалық теориясы және әлеуметтік әпистемологияның тұғырларын қамтитын пәнаралық талдауға негізделген. Негізгі нәтижелер сана және тілмен өзара қарекетте болатын динамикалық онтологиялық құрылым ретінде виртуалды шындық тұжырымдамасын қалыптастырудан тұрады. Зерттеуде виртуалдықтың технологиялық феномен болуымен қатар, шындықты қабылдау мен интерпретациялаудың іргелі мәселелерін қамтитын философиялық категория екені бағамдалады. Еңбектің спецификасы виртуалдықтың философиялық, лингвистикалық және семиотикалық талдауының интеграциясында түйінделген, бұл оны қазіргі философиялық дискурс аясында интерпретациялаудың жаңа тұғырын ұсынуға мүмкіндік береді.

**Түйін сөздер:** виртуалдық онтологиясы, сана философиясы, семиотика, менталдық кеңістік, когнитивті лингвистика, әлеуметтік әпистемология.

**Лифанов С.А., Лифанова Т.Ю., Веревкин А.В., Moldagaliyeva А.Е.**

**Виртуальная реальность и пределы интерпретации: философский подход**

**Аннотация.** Исследование посвящено философскому анализу виртуальной реальности как феномена, находящегося на пересечении онтологии, философии сознания и философии языка. Актуальность работы обусловлена возрастающей ролью виртуальной реальности в социальной и когнитивной сферах, а также необходимостью критического осмыслиения ее влияния на восприятие действительности. Цель исследования — выявить концептуальные основания виртуальности, используя философские, лингвистические и семиотические подходы. Методология базируется на междисциплинарном анализе, включающем философские концепции реальности, лингвистическую теорию ментальных пространств, а также подходы социальной эпистемологии. Основные результаты заключаются в формировании концепции виртуальной реальности как динамической онтологической структуры, взаимодействующей с сознанием и языком. В исследовании показано, что виртуальность не является исключительно технологическим феноменом, а представляет собой философскую категорию, затрагивающую фундаментальные вопросы восприятия и интерпретации реальности. Специфика работы заключается в интеграции философского, лингвистического и семиотического анализа виртуальности, что позволяет предложить новый подход к ее интерпретации в рамках современного философского дискурса.

**Ключевые слова:** онтология виртуальности, философия сознания, семиотика, ментальные пространства, когнитивная лингвистика, социальная эпистемология.

*Received 13.04.2025*

*Accepted 01.06.2025*